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Imagine the following hypothetical, patterned on an actual case 
pending in federal court,1 and you can begin to appreciate why there is a  
growing awareness of the need to have clear analytical thinking 
regarding the admissibility of electronically stored information, 
variously referred to as “ESI,” “digital,” “electronic,” “computer 
generated,” or “computer stored” evidence in state and federal courts. 
ConsumerPro is a corporation that provides installment credit to 
consumers with poor or un-established credit records to enable them to 
purchase on credit expensive electronic and computer products like flat 
screen televisions, computers, and entertainment systems.  Under their 
business plan, a purchaser agrees to buy a product in installments, such 
as automatic withdrawals from a bank account, and only after the 
purchaser has made a series of payments is the product shipped to the 
purchaser, who then continues to make payments until the purchase 
price is fully paid.   
ConsumerPro has a website that advertises its products, has contact 
information for inquiries about billing, and provides customer service.  
ConsumerPro makes most of its sales by running advertisements on 
national television by targeting its ads during popular TV programs.  The 
ads pitch the products, then list a telephone number to call for more 
information and to make a purchase, and encourage the viewer to call 
immediately to get the benefit of a time limited special deal.  When the 
purchaser calls the number, she speaks with a telemarketing employee of 
Tele-Sales, Inc., a separate company that ConsumerPro contracts with to 
handle the sales calls.  Because ConsumerPro provides installment 
credit, it must comply with a host of federal and state consumer 
protection laws that require certain mandatory disclosures that must be 
given, or the purchase is voidable, and ConsumerPro could also face 
civil and criminal penalties.  In order to comply with all the regulatory 
 
 1. The names of the parties used in the hypothetical are fictitious, as are some of the facts. 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/2
7-GRIMM_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:19 PM 
2009] BACK TO THE FUTURE: LORRAINE V. MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. 359 
  
requirements, ConsumerPro’s general counsel has carefully drafted the 
script that must be read with complete accuracy by the telemarketers 
working at Tele-Sales call centers.  To insure regulatory compliance, the 
contract between ConsumerPro and Tele-Sales requires use of the script 
provided by ConsumerPro, without deviation, and creates a penalty to 
Tele-Sales for each call that fails to adhere to the script.  Because the 
Tele-Sales telemarketers receive very sensitive financial information 
from the purchasers who call in, they operate under strict security 
conditions.  No writing materials are permitted in the call center.  The 
telemarketers have a phone headset they wear, and log into a secure 
ConsumerPro website, where the current version of the script is accessed 
and read to the purchaser, and when the telemarketer receives the 
purchaser’s financial information, it is entered by computer keyboard 
directly into the ConsumerPro website, which electronically records all 
the details of the purchase.  In addition, all the sales calls are recorded so 
that ConsumerPro can monitor them to ensure compliance with the 
disclosure script.  Thus, there are no “paper” copies of the script, or the 
individual installment sales contracts; all this information is 
electronically displayed and maintained by ConsumerPro.  If a dispute 
arises regarding a particular sale, ConsumerPro can print off the screen 
for the contract, and then listen to the recording of the sales call to 
determine if there was regulatory compliance and a valid sale.   
After six months of handling sales calls for ConsumerPro, Tele-
Sales’s contract is abruptly cancelled by ConsumerPro, allegedly 
because of systemic failures to comply with the obligation to adhere to 
the marketing script.  ConsumerPro contends that so many calls were 
noncompliant that most of the contracts are voidable, and refuses to pay 
Tele-Sales.  Tele-Sales contends that their telemarketers faithfully read 
the script, and that ConsumerPro changed the script frequently, 
significantly altering its content, and that ConsumerPro is attempting to 
avoid paying for calls that followed the script that appeared on the 
ConsumerPro marketing site, by referencing a subsequently changed 
version of the script.  ConsumerPro denies this, and contends that they 
matched the applicable script to the call, and determined that calls were 
noncompliant.  Because Tele-Sales does not have access to any “hard 
copies” of the various scripts they followed, they must rely on what their 
telemarketers recall as the content of the scripts.  Tele-Sales sues 
ConsumerPro in federal court for breach of contract, and ConsumerPro 
files a counterclaim for breach of contract. 
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In addition to its difficulties with Tele-Sales, ConsumerPro has 
other problems.  Thousands of customer complaints have been filed with 
the Federal Trade Commission and various state Attorneys General 
alleging unfair sales practices, misleading, inaccurate and false 
representations posted on the ConsumerPro website, bait-and-switch 
tactics, failure to adhere to the credit sales terms, failure to refund money 
for cancelled sales, and customer service complaints regarding inferior 
or deficient products.  The FTC conducts an investigation, initiates 
enforcement proceedings, concludes violations of federal law occurred, 
and negotiates a consent decree with ConsumerPro.  The FTC posts on 
its website the investigation report and consent decree, and posts a 
warning on its website for consumers, warning them about 
ConsumerPro.  Various state Attorneys General conduct their own 
investigations, commence enforcement proceedings, post the results of 
their investigations, and also post consumer warnings on their websites.  
Eventually, a class action consumer fraud lawsuit is filed against 
ConsumerPro. 
Myriad evidentiary issues are raised by this hypothetical.  First, 
with the exception of the contract between Tele-Sales and ConsumerPro, 
all of the “documentary evidence” that will determine the outcome of the 
contract suit is computer generated and stored ESI.  Second, the class 
action against ConsumerPro will depend largely on consumer testimony 
about what they saw on ConsumerPro’s website, which has been 
changed many times, as well as the results of the FTC and Attorneys 
General investigations that found unfair trade practices and consumer 
fraud.  The evidentiary issues associated with introducing electronic 
evidence are complicated, and until recently, have not been addressed in 
any comprehensive way.   
In a recent opinion, however, Lorraine v. Markel American 
Insurance Co.,2 the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland undertook the first comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary 
rules and case law that govern the admissibility of electronic evidence at 
trial, and for use at summary judgment.3  It remains the most 
comprehensive single opinion regarding the admissibility of ESI, and  
 
 2. 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
 3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1) (providing that “[a] supporting or opposing affidavit must be 
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the 
affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated”). 
4
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has frequently been cited by other courts and in secondary sources.4  
This Article will analyze the Lorraine opinion and its impact, as well as 
provide some insight regarding additional authority relating to this new 
frontier of evidence law. 
I.  DO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE? 
It is not a frivolous question to ask, “Do the existing rules of 
evidence adequately deal with admissibility of electronic evidence?”  In 
a thoughtful, recently published book, attorney George Paul, who has 
extensive experience dealing with evidentiary issues associated with 
ESI/digital evidence,5 made the following observations: 
The current evidentiary scheme comprises three main historical 
policies: (1) the notion of authentic writings, exemplified by the search 
for an “original” object tying certain people, acting at a certain time, to 
certain permanently recorded information; (2) the rule against hearsay, 
giving litigants the right to test factual statements through cross-
examination, unless there was an accepted policy reason not to do so; 
 
 4. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of America v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL 
4183981, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551); Phillips v. Morbark, 
Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (D.S.C. 2007) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 534-553); Scotts Co. 
LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 
2007) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547); Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660 
MMM (RCx), 2007 WL 3237727, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2007) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 
at 534); Adams v. Disbennett, No. 9-08-14, 2008 WL 4615623, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 
2008) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION AND PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY 
ON ESI EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY 1 (2008) [hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY] 
(recognizing Lorraine as the “recent, leading case on the subject” of using ESI as evidence “at trial 
or in motion practice”); Gordon J. Calhoun & Susan F. Friedman, The Stage is Set, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 
21, 2008, at 24 (“[Lorraine] provides an exegesis about what counsel must do when proffering ESI 
during dispositive motions or trials . . . . As ESI may likely constitute the majority of information 
offered as evidence in the future, counsel should utilize [Lorraine] as a road map to save time and 
money by getting the evidentiary foundation issues right on the first audition.”); Adam I. Cohen, 
The Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Where We Are One Year Later, CORPORATE 
COUNSELOR, Feb. 2008, at 4 (“In an opinion that is required reading for lawyers aspiring to use ESI 
to win a case, Judge Grimm delivered a sweeping review of prior case law and analysis of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to admissibility issues associated [with] all manner of 
electronic evidence.”); Sheldon M. Finkelstein & Evelyn R. Storch, Admissibility of Electronically 
Stored Information: It’s Still the Same Old Story, LITIGATION,  Spring 2008, at 13, 17 (“A helpful 
starting place for any analysis of admissibility of ESI is Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul 
W. Grimm’s decision in [Lorraine].  The lengthy ‘soup to nuts’ opinion is an authority-rich 
discourse of every facet of the admission of evidence generally and of ESI in particular.”); Dale 
Conder, Jr., The Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 2008, 
at 23, 29 (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 554, 574).  
 5. See GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE xxi (2007). 
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and (3) the notion that evidence, particularly evidence implicating 
specialized knowledge, be generally scientific in that it be subject to a 
“test” of its hypotheses or methodologies.  These policies are all 
stressed by digital evidence . . . . There is now a new world of [digital] 
evidence.  New foundations are necessary.6 
While this may be true, and a “new world order” of admitting and 
weighing electronic evidence an inevitable outcome,  this will not occur 
overnight, and in the interim there must be a method of dealing with the 
ever changing forms of digital or electronic evidence in court 
proceedings.  This means that the existing law of evidence must be 
applied to the admissibility of electronic evidence, and courts that have 
been asked to do so have expressed no significant concerns about the 
adequacy of those rules to accomplish this task.  As one court noted, 
“Essentially, appellant would have us create a whole new body of law 
just to deal with e-mails or instant messages. . . . We believe that e-mail 
messages and similar forms of electronic communications can be 
properly authenticated within the existing framework of [the rules of 
evidence].”7  Recognizing this, the Lorraine opinion identifies the 
following five evidentiary “hurdles” that must be evaluated in order to 
assess the admissibility of electronically stored or digital evidence: 
Whether ESI is admissible into evidence is determined by a collection 
of evidence rules that present themselves like a series of hurdles to be 
cleared by the proponent of the evidence.  Failure to clear any of these 
evidentiary hurdles means that the evidence will not be admissible.  
Whenever ESI is offered as evidence, either at trial or in summary 
judgment, the following evidence rules must be considered: (1) is the 
ESI relevant as determined by Rule 401 (does it have any tendency to 
make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation more or less 
probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if relevant under 401, is it 
authentic as required by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the 
ESI is what it purports to be); (3) if the ESI is offered for its 
substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it 
 
 6. Id. at 13-14. 
 7. In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).  See also DAVID F. HERR, MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th Ed. 2007) (stating that “the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to 
computerized data as they do to other types of evidence”); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538 n.5 (“FED. 
R. EVID. 102 contemplates that the rules of evidence are flexible enough to accommodate future 
‘growth and development’ to address technical changes not in existence as of the codification of the 
rules themselves.  Further, courts have had little difficulty using the existing rules of evidence to 
determine the admissibility of ESI, despite the technical challenges that sometimes must be 
overcome to do so.”). 
6
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covered by an applicable exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) is the 
form of the ESI that is being offered as evidence an original or 
duplicate under the original writing rule, or if not, is there admissible 
secondary evidence to prove the content of the ESI (Rules 1001-1008); 
and (5) is the probative value of the ESI substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified by 
Rule 403, such that it should be excluded despite its relevance.8 
However, before discussing each of these evidentiary hurdles, the 
Lorraine opinion noted the importance of Federal Rules of Evidence 
104(a) and 104(b), which deal with preliminary rulings on admissibility 
of evidence, existence of a privilege, and qualifications of witnesses, and 
the related concept of conditional relevance.9 
II.  PRELIMINARY MATTERS AND CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE. 
As noted in Lorraine, “the relationship between Rule 104(a) and (b) 
can complicate the process by which ESI is admitted into evidence at 
trial, or may be considered at summary judgment.”10  Rule 104(a) states:  
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence 
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b).  In making its determination it is not bound by the 
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.11   
This rule is important for several reasons.  First, it establishes the 
role of the trial judge as the one who must determine whether evidence 
is admissible, which includes the familiar foundational rulings such as 
whether evidence is relevant, and if so, if it is excessively prejudicial; 
whether an expert witness is qualified to testify, and if so whether her 
opinions have a sufficient factual basis and are based on reliable 
methodology; whether out of court statements, whether written or oral, 
are hearsay, and if so, whether they fall within the scope of a hearsay 
exception; whether an evidentiary privilege applies; and when the 
contents of a writing, recording or photograph are being proved, whether 
the proof constitutes an original, duplicate, or acceptable secondary 
 
 8. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 539. 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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evidence of its contents under the original writing rule.12  These 
preliminary evidentiary rulings  can be purely “legal,” such as whether 
proffered evidence is relevant (does it have “any tendency” to make a 
fact that is “of consequence” to the litigation more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the proffered evidence), but may also 
involve mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether a document 
qualifies as a business record (was it a record of a “business,” made at or 
near the time of the events referenced in the record, by someone with 
personal knowledge of those facts, was the activity that the record refers 
to a “regular” one, is it the regular practice of the business to “make and 
maintain” the record for use in its business, and whether the document is 
otherwise trustworthy, all of which require the judge to engage in fact 
finding).  
Rule 104(a) is qualified by Rule 104(b), which states: “When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of 
fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition.”13  This is the so-called “conditional relevance” rule, and it 
reserves for the jury the determination of disputed facts that must be 
established in order for certain proffered evidence to be relevant.  Thus, 
for example, if the plaintiff contends that her supervisor created a hostile 
workplace by sending her inappropriate e-mails, and the supervisor 
denies that he authored the e-mails, claiming instead that someone else 
“spoofed” them on his computer, the harassing e-mails will not be 
“relevant” (tend to prove intentional gender based discrimination) unless 
the jury first determines that the supervisor is the author.   
The Lorraine opinion notes the importance of Rule 104(b) with 
regard to one very important component of determining the admissibility 
of ESI, whether it is authentic, noting “‘because authentication is 
essentially a question of conditional relevancy, the jury ultimately 
resolves whether evidence admitted for its consideration is that which 
the proponent claims.’”14  Lorraine also points out a little appreciated 
 
 12. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 31-37 (3rd Ed. 
2003). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
 14. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539-40 (quoting United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 
(4th Cir. 1992)); see also FED. R. EVID. 901(a) advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 proposed 
rules (“Authentication and identification represent a special aspect of relevancy . . . . This 
requirement of showing authenticity or identity falls in the category of relevancy dependent upon 
fulfillment of a condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b).”) 
(citations omitted). 
8
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aspect of the relationship between Rule 104(a) and 104(b).  When a 
judge makes a preliminary determination under Rule 104(a) that 
evidence is admissible, or a privilege applies, or that a witness is 
qualified, he is not required to apply the rules of evidence except the 
rules of privilege when considering the facts proffered in support of and 
against the ruling.15  In contrast, however, when the jury is finding facts 
under the conditional relevance rule to determine whether proffered 
evidence is relevant, such as when they determine whether evidence of a 
posting on a website is authentic, the facts that they consider must be 
admissible in evidence.16  Lorraine summarizes this distinction as 
follows: 
In short, there is a significant difference between the way that Rule 
104(a) and 104(b) operate.  Because, under Rule 104(b), the jury, not 
the court, makes the factual findings that determine admissibility, the 
facts introduced must be admissible under the rules of evidence.  It is 
important to understand this relationship when seeking to admit ESI.  
For example, if an e-mail is offered into evidence, the determination of 
whether it is authentic would be for the jury to decide under Rule 
104(b), and the facts that they consider in making this determination 
must be admissible into evidence.  In contrast, if the ruling on whether 
the e-mail is an admission by a party opponent or a business record 
turns on contested facts, the admissibility of those facts will be 
determined by the judge under 104(a), and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, except for privilege, are inapplicable.17 
Few counsel fully appreciate the importance of this distinction, 
which is especially important when dealing with admissibility of ESI, 
because the most challenging aspect of admitting digital evidence is to 
establish its authenticity.18  Lorraine devotes its most extensive 
discussion to this issue.  The essential point to take away from this 
 
 15. See FED. R. EVID. RULE 104(a) (“In making its determination [the court] is not bound by 
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.”) (emphasis added).  See also FED. R. 
EVID. 1101(d)(1) (“The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following 
situations:  . . . The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when 
the issue is to be determined by the court under rule 104.”). 
 16. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 540. 
 17. Id.  
 18. PAUL, supra note 5, at 17 (“Thus two monumental changes are brought on by digital 
technology, affecting the two most important concepts in the law of evidence.  The first is related to 
the new type of writing that has evolved, viewed in its discrete manifestations.  The ‘object’ the law 
examines has changed radically.  It is no longer physical matter.  It is information itself.  Indeed, 
writing’s departure from the world of physical artifacts revolutionizes the concept of authenticity.  
The written record must now be analyzed differently than before.”). 
9
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discussion in Lorraine is that the proponent of digital evidence must 
carefully consider how she will authenticate it if its admissibility is 
challenged, and note that the evidence proffered to establish its 
authentication must itself be admissible into evidence. 
III.  AUTHENTICATION OF ESI 
In actuality, the authentication of evidence is a relatively 
straightforward concept: “A piece of paper or electronically stored 
information, without any indication of its creator, source, or custodian 
may not be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901.”19  
Nevertheless, in the two years since Lorraine was issued, courts and 
counsel still seem to struggle with the basic principles of authentication 
as it applies to electronic evidence.  Some courts are still permitting only 
rudimentary admissibility standards and counsel are still, at times, 
failing to meet that low bar.  As electronic evidence becomes more 
ubiquitous at trial, it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel 
give more in terms of authentication—and counsel who fail to meet 
courts’ expectations will do so at their own peril. 
It may come as no surprise to the readers of this Article that 
Lorraine was drafted, in part, as a “how to” for the authentication of 
electronic evidence.  It was written to assist counsel in better preparing 
themselves for the use of electronic evidence during trial by clarifying 
how Rules 901 and 902 might apply.  As Lorraine demonstrates, 
electronic evidence comes in many forms and it is no secret that 
someone highly adept with computers has the ability to make viewers 
see whatever he or she wants them to see.  But it is also a very real 
possibility that someone inept with computers may also alter electronic 
evidence so as to make it unusable or inadmissible.20  Therefore, as 
technology continues creating relevant evidence while, simultaneously, 
outpacing the working knowledge and ability of most lawyers and 
judges to deal with it, ensuring proper authentication of electronic 
evidence becomes a greater responsibility for attorneys and judges alike. 
 
 19. United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 20. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL pt.4, at 
20 (9th ed. vol. 5 2006) (“The wrinkle for authenticity purposes is that, because Internet data is 
electronic, it can be manipulated and offered into evidence in a distorted form.”). 
10
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A.  Rule 901 
Rule 901 requires that evidence be authenticated before being 
admitted.21  That requirement sets a relatively low bar, permitting 
evidence to be authenticated if the “matter in question is what its 
proponent claims.”22  But, as Lorraine points out, the rule is silent as to 
how, exactly, courts and lawyers should demonstrate that evidence is 
“what its proponent claims.”23  
As a launching point, Lorraine relied on a number of Rule 901(b) 
illustrations24 to describe the best manner by which to authenticate 
particular forms of electronic evidence.  The particular illustration to be 
applied depends generally on the type of electronic evidence to be 
admitted, the manner in which it was created, and its intended use at 
trial.  The most likely illustrations to apply to the majority of electronic 
evidence under Rule 901 include: 
 
• E-mail Evidence: 
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge” 
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert 
Witness”  
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the 
Like” 
• Internet Websites 
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge” 
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert 
Witness”  
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the 
Like” 
o Rule 901(b)(7), “Public Records or Reports” 
o Rule 901(b)(9), “Process or System” 
• Chat Room and Test Messages 
 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(a)). 
 24. Structurally, Rule 901 has two parts.  Rule 901(a) contains the substantive requirement 
that evidence be authenticated or identified before it may be admitted.  Rule 901(b) provides the 
non-exclusive illustrations of how this may be done.  The proponent of the evidence can, therefore, 
“pick and choose” among these illustrations, but is also free to develop others.  FED. R. EVID. 901. 
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o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge” 
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the 
Like” 
• Computerized Records or Data 
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge” 
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert 
Witness”  
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the 
Like” 
o Rule 901(b)(9), “Process or System” 
• Computer Animations 
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge” 
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert 
Witness”  
• Computer Simulations 
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge” 
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert 
Witness”  
• Digital Photographs 
o Rule 901(b)(9), “Process or System”25 
 
With this “checklist” in mind, it is helpful to see what courts have 
done with various types of ESI when determining whether it is authentic. 
1.  Internet Websites 
Introduction of the content of websites, and website search results, 
is becoming an increasingly common evidentiary occurrence.  Searches 
and Internet surfing are easy and common practices, but using those 
results at trial requires counsel to step away from the computer, and 
think about how, exactly, the proffered website should be authenticated. 
In Whelan v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,26 decided 
after Lorraine, the plaintiff sought to introduce Nexis printouts as 
 
 25. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541-49 (discussing Rule 901 and its subparts); id. at 554-63 
(applying Rule 901 to the types of evidence listed above). 
 26. No. CV06-4948PSG (PLAX), 2007 WL 1891175, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2007). 
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evidence to show that the doctor who performed the plaintiff’s 
examination was biased and closely affiliated with an insurance 
company.27  The plaintiff argued that the printouts would demonstrate 
that the doctor was associated with a network of providers that 
“cater[ed] exclusively to the insurance industry.”28  To authenticate the 
printouts, plaintiff’s counsel submitted a declaration “stating that the 
printouts are true and correct copies of the result of an internet search of 
services provided to insurance companies by [the network of 
providers].”29  The defendant objected to the evidence, in part, on the 
grounds that the evidence had not been authenticated.30   
The court examined the evidence and held that, although the 
printouts had a URL address and date stamp, the attorney’s declaration 
was insufficient to authenticate them.31  What was required, the court 
held, was a “declaration by the person who personally conducted the 
search, or by the company stating that the computer printouts are a true 
and correct copy of the information from its website.”32  The standard 
insisted upon by the court in Whelan reflects the manner in which courts 
may avoid the concerns identified in Lorraine that a website may 
include information not officially sanctioned by its alleged owner.  
Accordingly, when faced with the authentication of websites, as 
reflected in Whelan, courts may require “proof by the proponent that the 
organization hosting the website actually posted the statements or 
authorized their postings.”33   
A similar case, also decided after Lorraine, related to the 
authentication of websites and e-mails serves not only to underscore the 
importance of authentication, but as a warning that authentication should 
be done properly.  In Bowers v. Rector & Visitors of the University of 
Virginia,34 the authentication of e-mails and websites became an issue in 
the plaintiff’s claims associated with her termination from the 
University.35  As part of her cross-motion for summary judgment, the 
 
 27. Id. at *11. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.   
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007) (citing United States 
v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000); St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst. P.A. v. Sanderson, 
No. 8:06-CV-223-T-MSS, 2006 WL 1320242 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006); Wady v. Provident Life & 
Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).    
 34. No. 3:06cv00041, 2007 WL 2963818, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 9, 2007). 
 35. Id. at *1. 
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plaintiff, by counsel, submitted a thirty-eight page memorandum and 
seventy-four exhibits totaling over 600 pages.36  Included with those 600 
pages were an incendiary affidavit, fifty-one unauthenticated e-mails, 
and unauthenticated printouts from a Virginia Employment Commission 
website and a University of Virginia webpage.37  The defendants 
responded by contending that most of plaintiff’s evidence was 
inadmissible and moved to strike the plaintiff’s unauthenticated 
submissions while also seeking sanctions under Rule 56(g).38   
As part of her reply, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to remedy her 
failure to authenticate the e-mails and websites by way of a personal 
affidavit wherein “she stated that the contested exhibits were in fact 
‘authentic’ because the e-mails had been obtained from the defendants 
during the course of discovery and the web pages were taken from 
‘published’ internet websites.”39  Her attempt to authenticate was viewed 
by the court as “an abject failure on her part either to understand or to 
appreciate a number of evidence rules, including inter alia Evidence 
Rules 402, 404, 802, 805, and 901.”40  Accordingly, the court granted 
the defendants’ motion for Rule 56(g) sanctions, in part because:  
[T]he submission by plaintiff’s counsel of . . . more than fifty 
unauthenticated copies of e-mails convincingly demonstrates both a 
recklessness and an absence of preparation on the part of plaintiff’s 
counsel.  Equally so, her resort to use of her own affidavit in a 
misguided quick-and-easy attempt to fix significant evidentiary 
deficiencies, demonstrates a recklessness in preparation and a failure to 
exercise legal judgment abject.41   
2.  Chat Rooms and Text Messages 
Anyone with teenage children or who has been to the mall 
recognizes that chat rooms and instant and text messaging are playing a 
larger part in the way we communicate as a society.  Like it or hate it, it 
is a form of communication that is becoming increasingly pervasive, and 
therefore will be offered as evidence in civil and criminal cases.  Chat 
room and text or instant messaging “dialogues,” for example, pose 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at *2. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at *6. 
 41. Id. at *7. 
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unique challenges to authentication due in large part to the fact that they 
typically are created by parties using anonymity-protecting “screen 
names” on websites where the host cannot be assumed to know the 
content.  Courts have recognized numerous ways to authenticate the use 
of chat room transcripts, including authentication circumstantially under 
Rule 901(b)(4) and testimony by a witness with personal knowledge.42   
In Adams v. Disbennett,43 the court held that a witness with 
personal knowledge was sufficient to authenticate instant message texts.  
In a case arising between disgruntled online lovers, the municipal court 
permitted the plaintiff to introduce transcripts of instant messaging that 
took place between the couple.44  On appeal, defendant claimed that the 
court erred by admitting transcripts that plaintiff claimed were not 
properly authenticated under Ohio’s equivalent of Rule 901.45  At trial, 
the court permitted the plaintiff to authenticate the documents through 
his own testimony based on personal knowledge.46  As part of that 
testimony, the plaintiff identified his and defendant’s screen names, 
stated that he had not changed any of the private messages, and testified 
that the exhibits were a printout of what he saw on the screen on the 
various days the two chatted.47 
The defendant rebutted this evidence by stating that “she could not 
recall typing the messages [the plaintiff] attributed to her.”48  Relying in 
part on Lorraine, defendant challenged the authentication of the 
documents and urged the Court of Appeals of Ohio to find error in the 
lower court’s ruling through the use of a more exacting standard for the 
authentication of the transcripts.49  The court denied the defendant’s 
plea, finding no error since “there need be only a prima facie showing, to 
the court, of authenticity” and that the jury would be the final assessor of 
the full authenticity of the transcripts.50  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals found that the “trial court was in the best position to observe the 
witnesses and assess credibility” and that it did not abuse its discretion 
when it authenticated the plaintiff’s exhibits.51   
 
 42. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 556 (D. Md. 2007) 
 43. No. 9-08-14, 2008 WL 4615623 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008).   
 44. Id. at *2. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at *3-4 (citing Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007)). 
 50. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 51. Id. at *4. 
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3.  Computerized Records or Data 
As Lorraine warned, “although computer records are the easiest to 
authenticate, there is growing recognition that more care is required to 
authenticate these electronic records than traditional ‘hard copy’ 
records.”52  Cases decided after Lorraine illustrate this trend.   
A case in point is United States v. Baker,53 where prosecutors failed 
to authenticate key evidence related to the prosecution of a man charged 
with distributing child pornography.  That key piece of evidence was a 
report put together by the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (“NCMEC”) that summarized the tip it had received from 
Yahoo, Inc. regarding Baker’s uploading of child pornography to a 
website, along with the filenames of the forty-six images he uploaded.54  
Relying solely on Rules 803(6) and 803(8), the government argued that 
the report was admissible hearsay as a business or public record.55  But 
“[t]he Government’s position misse[d] the mark” in that it completely 
failed to authenticate the evidence.56    
During the course of the trial, the government failed to offer 
evidence to authenticate the NCMEC report.57  The only witness called 
to identify the report and the forty-six images it named was the 
investigating police officer from the Texas Attorney General’s Cyber 
Crimes Unit.58  This officer, however, did not testify that he had any 
personal knowledge of how the NCMEC report was prepared; nor did 
the officer have any knowledge of how the NCMEC responds to tips it 
receives from internet service providers.59  Additionally, the 
Government did not contend that the report was self-authenticating 
under Rule 902 or under any authentication methods listed in Rule 
901(b).60  In fact, the court pointed out, “[t]he record [was] devoid of 
any evidence authenticating [the exhibit].”61  Accordingly, as the 
 
 52. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 557. 
 53. 538 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 54. Id. at 331. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  This ruling emphasizes the critically important point that began the analysis in 
Lorraine, namely that there are a series of evidentiary rules that must be considered when planning 
to introduce ESI, and failure to do so risks exclusion of the evidence.  Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538-
39. 
 57. Baker, 538 F.3d at 331. 
 58. Id. at 326. 
 59. Id. at 332. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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unauthenticated exhibit was the only evidence introduced to demonstrate 
that the suspect uploaded child pornography, the court reversed and 
vacated those charges.62   
As demonstrated above, failing the simple first step of 
authentication proved fatal to the prosecution’s case.  The Baker court 
recognized that the showing required to authenticate digital evidence 
need not be great, and simply calling the NCMEC’s record custodian 
under Rule 901(b)(7) would have been sufficient for authentication.63  It 
would appear that the Fifth Circuit was not, in this case, concerned about 
the accuracy of the report, only that it was in fact what the Government 
purported it to be.64   
In another case dealing with computer files associated with child 
pornography, United States v. Salcido,65 a court once again examined 
whether the Government’s evidence was properly authenticated.  On the 
appeal of his conviction, Salcido claimed that the Government failed to 
authenticate the pornographic video and image files that were the basis 
of the charges against him.66  At trial, the Government introduced the 
video and image evidence “by presenting detailed evidence as to the 
chain of custody, specifically how the images were retrieved from the 
defendant’s computers.”67  The Ninth Circuit found that this was 
sufficient to authenticate the video and image evidence under Rule 
901.68   
The Baker and Salcido cases are noteworthy because they 
underscore that, while the authentication of digital evidence may not be 
necessarily rigorous, it must occur.  Both cases illustrate the observation 
made in Lorraine that “to date, more courts have tended towards the 
lenient rather than the demanding approach” of authentication.69   
For example, a similar, and surprisingly low bar for authentication 
was used by the U.S. District Court of Arizona in Linderoth Associates 
v. Amberwood Development, Inc.70  In support of its motion for 
summary judgment in a copyright case, a defendant proffered computer 
 
 62. Id. at 332-33. 
 63. Id. at 331 n.12. 
 64. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 557-59 (D. Md. 2007) (comparing 
standards for the admissibility of business records). 
 65. 506 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1918 (2008). 
 66. Id. at 732-33. 
 67. Id. at 733. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 558. 
 70. No. CV 06-00426-PHX-NVWAR, 2007 WL 2696851, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2007). 
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printouts purporting to identify the dates it started and finished an 
architectural plan that was at issue in the case.71  The plaintiff claimed 
that the printout was not properly authenticated and the court permitted 
the defendant to supply additional evidence to do so.72  In response, the 
defendant filed an affidavit with the court from the company’s vice-
president wherein he “swore that he ‘assist[s] with the management of 
the electronic storage of [defendant’s] files, including AutoCad files for 
floor plans and drawings,’ that he understood that ‘[defendant’s] 
database recorded the start and modification dates’ for the [at-issue] file, 
and that he had personally reviewed the file and verified that its creation 
date was [as stated in the printout].”73  Over the plaintiff’s objections, 
the court held that the defendant’s proffer was sufficient to authenticate 
the printouts.74  The court concluded that it would not be necessary for 
the individual authenticating the record to possess “technical knowledge 
of how the computer functions, nor is it necessary that the authenticator 
be the one who created the file.  It [would be] sufficient if the person 
authenticating the record ha[d] personal knowledge of the record system 
and [was] the custodian of the record in question.”75   
The authentication rule applied in Linderoth seemed to be an 
amalgamation of Rules 901(b)(1) and 901(b)(7), requiring the custodian 
of the record to have personal knowledge of the record system, but not 
the record itself.  Although Rules 901(b)(1) and 901(b)(7) may be 
sufficient for the authentication of some computer records, counsel 
should be cautious when relying on their minimal standards.  In relation 
to the type of computer record offered in Linderoth, the standard used by 
the court was minimal.  Were the printouts that were proffered a report 
automatically generated by AutoCad?  If so, was the process that created 
them reliable and accurate?  How did the court know that the dates 
reported on AutoCad and echoed in the report were, in fact, the proper 
dates?  The answers to these questions are unclear.  As a result, the 
opinion offers little guidance to attorneys who may be trying to 
authenticate similar files or reports in the future.  Accordingly, a more 
proper authentication for such evidence may be Rule 901(b)(9).76  Rule 
 
 71. Id. at *2. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (“Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a 
result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.”). 
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901(b)(9) “[was] designed for situations in which the accuracy of a 
result is dependent upon a process or system which produces it.”77  
Under the Rule 901(b)(9) standard “it is common for the proponent to 
provide evidence of the input procedures and their accuracy, and 
evidence that the computer was regularly tested for programming error,”  
and “[a]t a minimum, the proponent should present evidence sufficient 
to warrant a finding that the information is trustworthy and provide the 
opponent with an opportunity to inquire into the accuracy of the 
computer and of the input procedures.”78 
4.  Computer Records as Digital Images of Paper Records 
Another variety of digital evidence that has been the subject of 
scrutiny is digital images of paper records.  A November 2008 White 
Paper prepared by Cohasset Associates, Inc., emphasizes that many 
companies who currently possess paper records are in the process of 
converting or transforming them into computer records through 
scanning.79  The White Paper provides an exacting review on the subject 
of digital images and, in part, on how such images should be 
authenticated for use at trial.  Citing to Lorraine and In re Vee Vinhnee,80 
the paper suggests that, when seeking to authenticate digital copies of 
paper records, the proponent should add three steps to Professor 
Imwinkleried’s eleven-steps for foundation suggested for computer 
records.81  These steps include: 
 
 
 77. FED R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 proposed rules. 
 78. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
901.12[3], at 901-101 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (citations omitted).  See, e.g., Novak v. Tucows, Inc., No. 
06-CV-1909, 2007 WL 922306, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007) (holding evidence created for trial 
was sufficiently authenticated under Rule 901(b)(9) in that it sufficiently described “a process or 
system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate 
result”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 79. See COHASSET ASSOCIATES, INC., THE LEGALITY OF DIGITAL IMAGE COPIES OF PAPER 
RECORDS (October 2008), available at http://www.cohasset.com (click on “White Papers” tab, then 
click on “The Legality of Digital Image Copies of Paper Records”) [hereinafter THE WHITE PAPER].  
Cohasset Associates, Inc., is a nationwide consulting firm specializing in document-based 
information management, and has edited and published numerous studies on the use of alternative 
media for data storage. 
 80. Id. at 15 (citing Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Md. 2007); In 
re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 448 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)). 
 81. Id. at 15-16.  As noted by the In re Vee Vinhnee court, Professor Imwinkelried recognized 
“electronic records as a form of scientific evidence,” and suggested an eleven-step protocol for 
authentication of such evidence.  336 B.R. at 446. 
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• The business has established policies and 
procedures – guiding the execution of specific 
activities and serving to enhance the quality with 
which those activities are performed.  (This is 
significantly broader in scope than the #3 
Imwinkelried requirement, which is focused on 
“inserting data into the computer.”) 
• The business demonstrates it has created and 
retained “management evidence” detailing (for 
future quality verification) who did what, where and 
when in the execution of the specific activities in the 
regular course of business – showing that degree to 
which the policies and procedures were followed. 
• The business manifests that its “management 
evidence” was regularly audited for quality – and, 
as part of an ongoing continuous improvement 
process, deficiencies were addressed and 
improvements were made to achieve high quality82 
 
In proposing the additional steps, the White Paper suggests that 
challenges to a records management process could be foreclosed by 
establishing that the process by which documents were managed and/or 
converted was sound.  This is especially critical in terms of digitally 
converted records where the original, paper records are destroyed and no 
longer accessible after the information they contained is moved.83  If, at 
trial, the process used by the proponent of digitized records is found 
faulty, “the consequence of a ruling that some or all of that small 
percentage [of litigation relevant documents] is inadmissible could prove 
very costly.”84 
5.  Authentication by Experts  
Under Rule 901(b)(3), the authentication of some forms of 
electronic evidence may, at times, require the use of an expert to explain 
either the technology used to create the evidence or the evidence 
 
 82. THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 79, at 15-16. 
 83. Id. at 17. 
 84. Id. at 19 (comment by Judge Ronald J. Hedges as to the use of the additional 
requirements). 
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resulting from the use of technology.85  It should be noted, however, that 
authentication by an expert need not be overly burdensome.  Courts 
recognize that experts who rely on computers for their exhibits, 
opinions, or testimony, need not be intimately familiar with why or how 
the computers or software used by the expert works, so long as 
additional foundations are laid. 
In Connecticut v. Foreman,86 a criminal defendant attempted to 
have his conviction overturned, in part, because the lower court wrongly 
admitted computer generated, but non-enhanced, fingerprint evidence.87  
As part of his argument, the defendant claimed that the state failed to 
properly authenticate the computer-generated evidence since the 
fingerprint expert did not know “how the software . . . manipulated or 
converted the images [of fingerprints], what the rate of error was in 
producing the images, or if there was any peer review of that scientific 
methodology.”88  The court, relying upon Rule 901 and federal case law, 
rejected the defendant’s argument and found that the State had laid 
sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the evidence by showing 
the computer technology relied on by the witness was in use throughout 
the state, the expert was highly trained, the identification results were 
independently verified, and by way of the unique nature of fingerprints 
themselves.89  The court concluded that the expert had sufficient 
knowledge of the processes to lay an adequate foundation, despite not 
knowing the algorithms utilized in the computer programs or of any 
published error rates for the program.90 
However, a word of caution on the use of experts; if relying on an 
expert to authenticate evidence, the expert and his or her opinions or 
proposed testimony should be disclosed pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(a)(2).91  Failure to do so may make the expert’s 
testimony, and thereby the expert’s authentication, impermissible at trial.  
This was the lesson learned by counsel in Insight Technology v. Surefire, 
LLC.,92 another post-Lorraine case, when defendant failed to identify the 
witness it was planning to use to authenticate computer animations in a 
patent case.  Defendants attempted to argue that the failure was harmless 
 
 85. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). 
 86. 954 A.2d 135 (Conn. 2008). 
 87. Id. at 157. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 160-62. 
 90. Id. at 161-62. 
 91. See  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2). 
 92. Civ. No. 04-CV-74-JD, 2007 WL 3244092, at*2 (D.N.H. Nov. 1, 2007). 
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because the proffered animations “depict devices which are well known 
to [plaintiff] and have been the subject of [the] litigation since the 
outset;” the animations only show the devices “more clearly.”93  Plaintiff 
objected to the expert’s opinion claiming it was prejudiced by the lack of 
notice and did not have the chance to depose the expert.94  The court 
agreed, and reasoned that plaintiff was indeed prejudiced because, in 
part, the animations showed the devices “more clearly.”95  As a result, 
the expert’s testimony was stricken.96  As for the animations, the court, 
citing to Lorraine, held that “[t]o be admissible, the animations must be 
authenticated by independent evidence or be self authenticating.”97  But, 
in the absence of the expert’s testimony, “the animations are 
unauthenticated drawings of unauthenticated devices” and were held 
inadmissible and therefore not able to support the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment.98 
6.  Computer Animations and Simulations 
As referenced by the Insight Technology court, computer 
animations are most often used by practitioners as demonstrative 
evidence “‘to illustrate and explain a witness’s testimony,’”99  and to be 
admissible, must be “‘authenticated by testimony of a witness with 
personal knowledge of the content of the animation, upon a showing that 
it fairly and adequately portrays the facts and that it will help to illustrate 
the testimony given in the case.’”100 Such a standard has been held to be 
applicable in both state101 and federal courts;102 however, when dealing 
 
 93. Id. at * 2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *3 (citing FED. R. EVID. 901; Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559 
(D. Md. 2007)). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559 (quoting State v. Sayles, 662 N.W. 2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2003)); 
accord Insight Tech., 2007 WL 3244092, at *3 (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559). 
 100. Insight Tech., 2007 WL 3244092, at *3 (quoting Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559); see also 
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 (stating that “the most frequent methods of authenticating computer 
animations [and simulations] are 901(b)(1) (witness with personal knowledge), and 901(b)(3) 
(testimony of an expert witness)”). 
 101. See, e.g., Tull v. Fed. Express Corp., 197 P.3d 495, 500 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (noting a 
computer animation used as a demonstrative aid must be a fair and accurate representation of the 
evidence to which it relates, it must be relevant, and its probative value must not be substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise); see also 
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with the authenticity and admissibility of computer simulations, 
practitioners should recognize the use of different standards in state and 
federal courts.  Although this point was briefly alluded to in Lorraine, 
the next section of this Article will provide elaboration not contained in 
Lorraine to help bring the case forward, and provide a more thorough 
commentary on the law covering the admissibility of computer 
simulations.103 
Unlike computer animations, which are offered into evidence for 
demonstrative purposes, computer simulations are a form of scientific 
evidence offered for substantive purposes.104  “[S]ubstantive evidence 
has independent probative value and can be used by an expert as the 
basis of the expert’s opinion,” and, as a result, is subject to more 
stringent reliability “tests.”105  Depending on the court in which the 
proponent of the computer simulation was operating, such tests would 
include either the standards elicited in Frye v. United States,106 Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
 
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 (citing People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602 (Colo. App. 2001); Clark v. 
Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 2000)). 
 102. See, e.g., Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d 580, 583-84 (E.D. 
Va. 2008) (noting “demonstrative aids,” including “computer animations,” are authenticated based 
on testimony from a witness that they are substantially accurate representations of what that witness 
is trying to describe) (citation omitted)); Insight Tech., 2007 WL 3244092, at *3; Lorraine, 241 
F.R.D. at 559 (“The use of computer animations is allowed when it satisfies the usual foundational 
requirements for demonstrative evidence.  At a minimum, the animation’s proponent must show the 
computer simulation fairly and accurately depicts what it represents, whether through the computer 
expert who prepared it or some other witness who is qualified to so testify, and the opposing party 
must be afforded an opportunity for cross-examination.”) (quoting Friend v. Time Mfg. Co., No. 03-
343-TUC-CKJ, 2006 WL 2135807, at *7 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 103. One student commentator has posited that Lorraine does not effectively differentiate 
between state and federal law when discussing the admissibility of computer simulations.  See 
Lindsay Kemp, Comment, Lorraine v. Markel: An Authoritative Opinion Sets the Bar for 
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence (Except for Computer Animations and Simulations), 9 N.C. J. 
L. & TECH. 16, 27 (2007) (“However, Lorraine hardly mentioned that the rules of admitting 
scientific evidence [in federal court] are governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, and 
this omission could be confusing to a lawyer looking to Lorraine as an authoritative and all-
inclusive guide.”) (footnote omitted)); but see Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560-61 (stating that “[u]se of 
an expert witness to authenticate a computer simulation likely will also involve Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702 and 703”).   
 104. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 (citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.03[1], at 
900-21; IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS, § 4.09[4][a], [c] (2002 Lexis)); see also 
Hon. Paul W. Grimm & Claudia Diamond, Low-Tech Solutions to High-Tech Wizardy: Computer 
Generated Evidence, 37 MD. B.J. 5, 9-10 (2004). 
 105. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[d][ii], at 900-123. 
 106. 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923). 
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Inc.,107 or some variation thereof.108  Whereas a court relying on the Frye 
analysis must see if a novel theory and method used by the expert 
witness have been generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community,109 a court using a Rule 702 and/or Daubert analysis must 
determine whether the testimony, regardless of novelty, is based on 
sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and the witness applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts 
of the case.110 
For example, in State v. Sipin,111 a defendant and his co-passenger 
were allegedly traveling in the defendant’s vehicle at a high rate of speed 
when the vehicle suddenly collided with a mailbox and a large tree.112  
As a result of the crash, the defendant suffered from permanent brain 
damage, and the co-passenger died from injuries sustained in the 
crash.113  The State charged the defendant with vehicular homicide, but 
there was a genuine dispute as to whether the defendant or the co-
passenger had been driving the vehicle at the time of the crash; when 
local neighbors approached the accident scene, they noticed that both 
men had been ejected from the car, and neither was present in the 
driver’s seat.114  The co-passenger was found on the ground between the 
passenger-side door and the tree, with only one foot in the car, and the 
defendant was found about ten to fifteen feet behind the vehicle.115 
In order to prove the defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the 
time of the crash, the State sought to admit into evidence a computer 
simulation generated by the “PC-CRASH” program, as well as the 
 
 107. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (adopting the standard for admission of expert testimony set forth in 
Rule 702). 
 108. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post–Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific 
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001) (providing an exhaustive 
compilation of the various evidentiary standards used by particular courts). 
 109. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 110. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to the 2000 
amendments (“Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the 
reliability of scientific expert testimony.  The specific factors explicated by the Daubert Court are 
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested . . . ; (2) whether the 
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate 
of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and 
controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community.”).  
 111. 123 P.3d 862 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 112. Id. at 864.  
 113. Id. at 865. 
 114. Id. at 864. 
 115. Id. 
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accompanying testimony by the State’s PC-CRASH expert witness.116  
In response, the defendant asserted that the computer generated evidence 
was inadmissible under Frye, and the trial court conducted a Frye 
hearing to determine the admissibility of the PC-CRASH simulation and 
the expert witness’s testimony.117 
During the Frye hearing, the expert witness testified that the PC-
CRASH simulation program involved “‘inputting’ variables from the 
scene and the vehicle, such as steering, braking, and speed, [which] 
would create a predictive image of the vehicle movement, based on the 
laws of physics.”118  The expert could not provide any validation studies 
that had been done on the use of the PC-CRASH program to simulate 
the movement of a human body within the interior of a vehicle during a 
car accident; however, the expert asserted that such simulations would 
be identical to PC-CRASH system principles used to predict interaction 
between a human body and the exterior of a vehicle.119 
At the conclusion of the Frye hearing, the trial court admitted the 
PC-CRASH system into evidence, and permitted the expert witness to 
testify at trial.120  The defendant was convicted, and subsequently 
appealed.121  On appeal, he contended that the PC-CRASH system had 
not been validated for the use exercised by the expert witness in 
reconstructing the accident.122 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Washington initially 
recounted the standard under Frye to address the admissibility of 
computer simulations as substantive evidence: 
Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue uniformly hold that the 
admissibility of computer-generated models or simulations (as opposed 
to animations) as substantive proof or as the basis for expert testimony 
regarding matters of substantive proof is conditioned upon a sufficient 
showing that (1) the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input 
and underlying equations are sufficiently complete and accurate (and 
disclosed to the opposing party so that they can be challenged); and (3) 
the program is generally accepted by the appropriate community of 
scientists for use in the particular situation at hand.  We agree with 
these courts, and hold that . . . computer-generated simulations used as 
 
 116. Id. at 865. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 866. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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substantive evidence or as the basis for expert testimony regarding 
matters of substantive proof must have been generated from computer 
programs that are generally accepted by the appropriate community of 
scientists to be valid for the purposes at issue in the case.123 
The appellate court found that the PC-CRASH computer simulation 
did not meet the requirements of Frye due to the two post-trial 
declarations provided by the defendant, three scholarly papers, and 
manuals for the PC-CRASH program that all suggested that there was a 
“lack of consensus in the relevant scientific community” regarding the 
use of the PC-CRASH program by the State.124  It should be noted that 
although the Sipin court purportedly applied the Frye test and its central 
focus of general acceptance within the relevant scientific community, the 
three-factor test the court embraced was more akin to the post-Daubert 
version of Rule 702.  Specifically, the examination of sufficiently 
complete input (i.e., sufficient underlying facts), and that the underlying 
equations used by the computer program as part of its analysis are 
sufficiently complete and accurate (i.e., reliable methods and principles).  
Accordingly, the analysis applied by the court, which is more detailed 
 
 123. Id. at 868-69 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Ruffin ex rel. Sanders v. 
Boler, 890 N.E.2d 1174, 1181, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (addressing admissibility of computer 
simulation to “describe the contact forces that are experienced between [an] infant’s shoulder and 
the maternal pelvis during labor”); State v. Phillips, 98 P.3d 838, 842-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) 
(addressing admissibility of PC-CRASH computer simulation to predict movement of  a vehicle in a 
single-impact crash).  The three-factor test mentioned by the Sipin court is drawn from Commercial 
Union Insurance Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992), which, as suggested 
by Lorraine, is often used by courts following Frye to gauge the admissibility of computer 
simulations as substantive evidence.  See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 560 (D. 
Md. 2007) (citing Commercial Union, 591 N.E.2d at 168; Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 
93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Kudlacek v. Fiat, 509 N.W.2d 603 (Neb. 1994)); see also State v. Clark, 
655 N.E.2d 795, 812 (Ohio App. Ct. 1995) (“[W]hile the third prong of the test invokes the Frye 
test, which has been rejected in Ohio, we believe the fact that other jurisdictions, including our own, 
allow for the admission of computer-generated simulations or reconstructions speaks for the 
reliability of such simulations within the relevant technical community.” (citations omitted)).  
Interestingly, as with the Commercial Union court, the Sipin court did not question whether the 
computer running the simulation program was running properly, or the input and underlying 
equations were accurate.  See Sipin, 123 P.3d at 868-69; Commercial Union, 591 N.E.2d at 168; but 
see Bray, 949 S.W.2d at 97-98 (“Courts have not required the first requirement of the Commercial 
Union guideline, that the computer be functioning properly, to be affirmatively shown in the 
absence of any challenge thereto. . . . With respect to the second Commercial Union guideline, cases 
generally require that the accuracy of the input be established.  However, the relevant technical or 
scientific community’s use of or reliance on such software has been held sufficient to establish the 
accuracy of the software.”) (citations omitted)). 
 124. Sipin, 123 P.3d at 870. 
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than the language in Frye itself, would result in the same outcome as if 
Rule 702/Daubert had been used. 
By contrast, in Turner v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company,125 the plaintiff sued his insurer, defendant Liberty Mutual, for 
allegedly breaching an insurance contract after the defendant failed to 
pay insurance proceeds to the plaintiff after a fire destroyed his home.126  
The defendant countered that the plaintiff was solely responsible for the 
destruction of his home.127  To justify its contention, the defendant 
sought to have an expert witness testify at trial regarding two reports.128  
The first report concluded “the fire evolution could not have developed 
as rapidly as it did without the introduction of accelerants into the floor 
surfaces of the home.”129  The second report, which was based on 
various computer simulations, noted that the fire would still have to “be 
classified as incendiary.”130  To prevent the expert from testifying, the 
plaintiff filed a motion in limine, and the U.S. District Court, Northern 
District of Ohio, relying on Rule 702 and Daubert, analyzed the 
admissibility of the computer simulations used as the underlying basis 
for the expert’s report.131  Through its analysis, the court unquestionably 
found the computer simulations to be inherently reliable, and therefore 
admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert: the software was found to have 
been sufficiently tested, was adequately subject to peer review and 
publication, had known error rates for the court to consider, and the 
computer simulation methodology was generally accepted by the 
relevant scientific community.132 
Reading the Sipin and Turner cases in tandem, the lesson to be 
learned is, be it under Frye or the Rule 702/Daubert approach, courts 
recognize that when computer simulations, as opposed to animations, are 
offered into evidence, proponents must satisfy the authentication 
requirements of Rule 901, and also must demonstrate that the evidence is 
reliable.  Under Rule 702/Daubert, this requires including evidence of a 
sufficient factual basis, as well as proof that the analytical methodology 
 
 125. No. 4:07-cv-00163, 2007 WL 2713062 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2007). 
 126. Id. at *1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at *2-3. 
 132. Id. at *3-4.  See also Silong v. United States, No. CV F 06-0474 LJO DLB, 2007 WL 
2535126, at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2007) (applying Daubert factors to computer model 
displaying potential injury to child during birth). 
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used by the computer program is reliable and based on reliable 
principles.  Similarly, under a Frye analysis, courts are not likely to 
adopt mere conclusory statements from the witness who performed the 
simulation that experts in the same field have generally accepted, but, 
instead, will demand evidence that demonstrates sufficient factual 
“input,” and that the program itself is “valid,” meaning that the analysis 
that it performs is the product of reliable methodology.  It should be kept 
in mind that the approach taken by the courts regarding admissibility of 
computer simulations conjoins the standards governing authentication 
under Rules 901 and 902 with the expert witness rules under Rules 702-
704, and thus an expert witness likely will be required to authenticate the 
computer simulation. 
B.  Rule 902 
For purposes of authentication, Rule 902 is markedly different from 
its counterpart, Rule 901, under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Rule 
902 provides that extrinsic evidence of authentication as a pre-condition 
to admissibility is not required for certain types of proffered materials; 
therefore, the requirement of Rule 901 that the exhibit must be shown to 
be what it purports to be will be automatically met if the exhibit falls 
into any of the classifications listed under Rule 902.133  The benefit of 
this rule is easily apparent—by having an exhibit be “self-
authenticating,” it dispenses with the need of having an authenticating 
witness come to trial and testify to her knowledge of and familiarity with 
an exhibit.  With countless documents and records now available online, 
the application of Rule 902 to the digital realm stands to be a boon for 
any given proponent of a particular exhibit, although, surprisingly, 
lawyers and courts have been slow to take advantage of it. 
Lorraine recognized that Rule 902, in its entirety, could provide for 
the self-authentication of ESI, and explicitly noted Rules 902(5), 902(7), 
and 902(11) as permitting self-authentication of electronic records.134  
Of the three rules, Rule 902(5), which permits self-authentication of 
official records, has been most readily used by other courts to justify the 
self-authentication of official records posted on the websites of public 
authorities. 
 
 133. FED. R. EVID. 902. 
 134. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 551 (D. Md. 2007) (citing FED. R. 
EVID. 902(5), (7) & (11)).    
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1.  Self-Authentication of Official Publications under Rule 902(5) 
Rule 902(5) provides for the self-authentication of “[o]fficial 
publications,” which could include “[b]ooks, pamphlets, or other 
publications purporting to be issued by public authority.”135  With this 
point in mind, and relying on the ruling in Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.,136 the 
Lorraine court noted that printed web pages from websites of public 
authorities would qualify as self-authenticating “official publications” 
under Rule 902(5).137  Taking into account the frequency with which 
official publications from government agencies could impact pending 
litigation, as well as the increasing tendency for such agencies to have 
their own websites, Rule 902(5) could now be seen as providing a 
convenient avenue for authenticating such publications.138 
Most recently, in Williams v. Long,139 the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland determined whether printed web 
pages from various Maryland State government websites could qualify 
as self-authenticating official publications under Rule 902(5).  In the 
case, the plaintiffs alleged that their employer, the defendant, violated 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)140 by failing to compensate the 
plaintiffs at the minimum wage and provide overtime pay.141  The 
plaintiffs subsequently moved to conditionally certify a collective action, 
and sought approval and facilitation of a notice to class members 
potentially interested in joining the suit.142  In order to justify the 
certification, the plaintiffs would have to prove there were other 
individuals “similarly situated” to the plaintiffs; therefore, plaintiffs’ 
counsel attached five exhibits to the plaintiffs’ motion for certification, 
which detailed the defendant’s alleged actions against those similarly 
situated to the instant plaintiffs.143 
 
 135. FED R. EVID. 902(5). 
 136. No. Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, *1-2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (holding printed 
webpage from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau as self-authenticating under Rule 902(5)). 
 137. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551 (citing E.I. DuPont, 2004 WL 2347556). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 585 F. Supp. 2d 679 (D. Md. 2008). 
 140. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2008). 
 141. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 681. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 682 (citing 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (West 2008)) (outlining the requirements for 
certification of a class action under the FLSA). 
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The court noted that two of the five exhibits consisted of printed 
web pages from websites.144  The plaintiffs’ first exhibit was printed web 
pages from the Maryland Judiciary Case search website,145 which had 
not been authenticated by any attached affidavit or extrinsic evidence.146  
A reading of the web pages revealed that there were three pending 
lawsuits against the defendant in the Baltimore City District Court; 
however, the suits were only described as “Contract” claims, and failed 
to address the facts of each particular suit.147  Additionally, the plaintiffs’ 
third exhibit featured printed case search results from the Employment 
Standards Service of the Division of Labor and Industry, in the 
Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation.148  The 
search results showed there were four closed claims against the 
defendant, but not did mention the facts of each particular claim, and 
were also not authenticated by any affidavit or extrinsic evidence.149  
The court went on to consider each website that hosted the particular 
web pages and found that access to the information contained in the 
Employment Standards Service web pages was not available without an 
employee e-mail address and password.150  At a subsequent hearing on 
the plaintiffs’ motion, plaintiffs’ counsel proffered that he had obtained 
the information contained in the third exhibit through a request for 
records under the Maryland Public Information Act.151 
Before addressing the applicability of Rule 902(5) to the plaintiffs’ 
submitted web pages, the Williams court defined the applicability of 
Rule 902(5) to any information posted on the Internet.152  This resulted 
in the court analyzing how a “public authority” was defined under the 
rule, as well as an “other publication.”153  First, the court noted that 
“‘Rule 902(5) [was] silent on what level of government must authorize 
the publication’”;154 however, “‘Rule 902(5) [was] most often construed 
to cover the governmental bodies listed in [Rule 902(1)], which provides 
for self-authentication of domestic publication documents under 
 
 144. Id. at 682-83. 
 145. Id. at 682. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 683. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See id. at 685-87. 
 153. Id. at 686-87. 
 154. Id. at 686 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 902.07[1], at 902-29). 
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seal.’”155  As a result, the following entities would be regarded as public 
authorities: “(1) the United States, (2) any State, (3) any district, 
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States, (4) 
the Panama Canal Zone, (5) the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 
[and] (6) a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency of any of 
the preceding bodies.”156  The universe of public authorities, thus, is 
broad.  Second, the court remarked that Rule 902(5) would cover the 
self-authentication of “‘statute books and case reports,’ as well as 
‘legislative reports, published transcripts of hearings, maps and surveys, 
collected statistics, commissioned studies, manuals,’ and other data 
compilation publications from public authorities.”157   
With these two points in mind, Williams recognized that courts 
were accepting “the posting of information on a website sponsored by a 
public authority [as] the functional equivalent of publication” under Rule 
902(5).158  Accordingly, postings on “government websites” were 
 
 155. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 902(1).  
 156. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 
902.07[1], at 902-30 & n.4). 
 157. Id. at 686-87 (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 9:34, at 589 (3d ed. 2007); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra, § 9:34, at 589 
n.4 (citing Gregg v. Forsyth, 65 U.S. 179 (1860) (authentication of papers contained in volumes of 
American State Papers); Watkins v. Holman’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 25, 39 (1842) (authentication of 
“volume of state papers published . . . under an act of congress”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 1 F.R.D. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (authentication of  a “public document, lawfully printed at 
the Government Printing Office in obedience to a valid order made by the Senate”); United States v. 
Shafer, 132 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D. Md. 1955), aff’d, 229 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1956) (authentication of 
documents published in the Federal Register); Stewart v. United States, 211 F. 41, 45 (9th Cir. 
1914) (authentication of a map from the General Land Office)); Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 687 
(citing Conjour v. Whitehall Twp., 850 F. Supp. 309, 312 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (self-authentication of 
local ordinances and regulations); Biggers ex. rel. Key v. S. Ry. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (N.D. 
Ga. 1993) (self-authentication of a certified copy of a state map issued by the Georgia Department 
of Transportation)). 
 158. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (citing Sannes v. Jeff Wyler Chevrolet, Inc., No. C-1-97-
930, 1999 WL 33313134, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1999) (recognizing the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), an agency of a governmental body, as a public authority, and thereby 
determining information published on the FTC’s website to be self-authenticating); Hispanic Broad. 
Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV027134CAS (AJWX), 2003 WL 22867633, at *5 n.5 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 30, 2003) (“[E]xhibits which consist of records from government websites, such as the 
FCC website, are self-authenticating.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWx), 
2004 WL 5615656, at *5 n.7 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004) (noting “records from government websites 
are self-authenticating,” and permitted a plaintiff to introduce internet reports from the U.S. State 
Department website); Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660 MMM (RCx), 2007 WL 
3237727, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2007) (finding the Office of the Inspector General’s report to 
be self-authenticating based on availability on the Internet)). 
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deemed to be “inherently authentic.”159  Williams also noted the 
following: 
A proponent of ESI could use the [uniform resource locator], date, 
and/or official title on a printed webpage to show that the information 
was from a public authority’s website, and therefore, self-
authenticating. . . . [T]he public authority’s selection of the posted 
information for publication on its website [would act] as the necessary 
“seal of approval” needed to establish that the information came from a 
public authority for purposes of Rule 902(5).160   
Through this method, the court found the printed web pages from 
the Maryland Judiciary Case Search and Employment Standards Service 
websites to be self-authenticating.161  Although access to the webpage 
from the Employment Standards Service website was limited by security 
measures, the court cautioned that it was important not to confuse 
“‘publication,’ as used by Rule 902(5), with ‘unrestricted publication to 
the general public.’”162  Rule 902(5) contains no requirement that 
information must be readily available to the public, and simply because 
additional measures, such as a subpoena or request or records, would 
have to be employed to gain access to a publication does not mean that 
 
 159. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 687.  One court has, however, found that the type of 
information found on a website may affect whether the information itself can be found to be self-
authenticating under Rule 902(5).  See In re Poirier, 346 B.R. 585, 588-89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) 
(declining to take judicial notice of information posted on the Department of Education’s (“DOE”) 
website because there were too many links to various “documents” which could not be reasonably 
identified as “official records,” “reports,” or a “publication issued by a public authority”); but see 
Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 688 n. 4 (“The correctness of the conclusion reached by the In re 
Poirier court is questionable.  Rule 902(5) provides for self-authentication of ‘other publications,’ 
and it is the act of posting information on the Internet by a qualifying public authority that is the act 
of publication.  Because the DOE is a department of one of the governmental bodies listed in Rule 
902(1), then the DOE would also be considered a public authority.  Thus, when the DOE posted 
information on its site, it vouched for its authenticity, thereby making it self-authenticating under 
Rule 902(5).  There is nothing in the rule that states the public authority publishing the information 
(whether in print form, or online) must originate the information posted.  Rather, the publication 
must have actually been approved by the public authority, or, as some would say, ‘made official.’  
Thus, the information’s adoption by reference by the public authority seems sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 902(5).”).    
 160. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 689; see also, e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. 
Kempthorne, No. 3:06-cv-00081 (PCD), 2008 WL 4000179, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2008) 
(finding Government press release to be self-authenticating because petitioner included the web 
address for the press release in its Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement, thereby allowing the court to 
verify that the press release was a copy of an official document issued by a public authority). 
 161. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
 162. Id. at 689-90. 
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the publication could not be self-authenticating.163  Thus, if information 
was published on a website by a public authority, and that information 
was obtained pursuant to a federal or state freedom of information act, 
then that printed information would in fact be self-authenticating under 
Rule 902(5).164  
2.  Self-Authentication of Inscriptions under Rule 902(7) 
Rule 902(7) permits the self-authentication of “[i]nscriptions, signs, 
tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business 
and indicating ownership, control, or origin.”165  As noted by one 
commentator, “‘business e-mails often contain information showing the 
origin of the transmission and identifying the employer-company.’”166  
Therefore, “‘[t]he identification marker alone may be sufficient to 
authenticate an e-mail under Rule 902(7).’”167  However, simply because 
an individual’s sending address is present on an e-mail does not 
constitute definitive proof that the person actually sent the e-mail, and 
authentication of an e-mail could still possibly require testimony from a 
person with personal knowledge of the transmission or its receipt to 
ensure its trustworthiness.168 
At this time, no case since Lorraine has discussed the use of Rule 
902(7) to gauge the authenticity of an e-mail.  Nevertheless, at least one 
court has implicitly recognized the authenticity of an e-mail based on the 
identity of its author.  In Sklar v. Clough,169 students at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology filed suit against various Georgia Tech officials, 
alleging that Georgia Tech was banning the use of students’ activities 
fees for religious and political activities, and unconstitutionally 
establishing a specific religious view with the school’s “Safe Space 
Program.”170  In their opposition to the students’ motion for summary 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.; c.f. id. (citing Wolf Lake Terminals, Inc. v. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d 
933, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (discussing the self-authentication of two U.S. Government documents 
obtained through the FOIA); Schmutte v. Resort Condos. Int’l, LLC, No. 1:05-cv-0311-LJM-WTL, 
2006 WL 3462656, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2006) (discussing the self-authentication of 
Department of Labor file produced pursuant to a FOIA request)). 
 165. FED. R. EVID. 902(7). 
 166. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 551-52 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[3][c], at 900-105). 
 167. Id. at 552 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[3][c], at 900-105). 
 168. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[3][c][i], at 900-105. 
 169. No. 1:06-CV-0627-JOF, 2007 WL 2049698 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2007). 
 170. Id. at *1. 
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judgment, the officials contended that various attached exhibits had “not 
been properly authenticated, [were] hearsay, and [were] not otherwise 
admissible at trial.”171  In particular, officials sought to exclude various 
e-mails from school officials that purportedly detailed the extent of the 
involvement of the Georgia Tech administration with the Safe Space 
Program.172  Without relying on Rule 902(7), the court did find the e-
mails to be “authenticated,” mainly “because they were produced by [the 
school officials] in the litigation.”173  Other courts have frequently held 
that if a document is produced by an opposing party during discovery, 
then it is sufficiently authenticated, and will qualify as an admission of a 
party opponent, thereby qualifying the document as non-hearsay under 
Rule 801(d)(2).174  As a result, a proponent of an e-mail, which had been 
sent in the regular course of business, could rely on an identification 
marker to prove the e-mail came from a party opponent, thereby 
guaranteeing its authenticity and admissibility.  
3.  Self-Authentication of Domestic Records under Rule 902(11) 
Rule 902(11) provides for the following: 
(11) Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity.  The 
original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted 
activity that would  be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied 
by a written declaration of its custodian or other qualified person, in a 
manner complying with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, certifying that the 
record: 
(A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set 
forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge 
of those matters; 
(B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and 
(C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice. 
A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph 
must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, and 
must make the record and declaration available for inspection 
 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at *5. 
 174. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, 285 F.3d 808, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2006); In re Homestore.com, Inc., 347 F. 
Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  For a more thorough discussion on hearsay in an ESI context, 
see infra Part IV. 
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sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge them.175     
As recognized by the Lorraine court, compliance with Rule 
902(11) requires a proponent of electronic evidence to establish all the 
elements of the business record exception to the hearsay rule; therefore, 
courts usually analyze an authenticity issue under Rule 902(11) 
concomitantly with the business record exception under Rule 803(6).176  
First, in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineone Technologies AG,177 a plaintiff 
computer memory systems designer filed suit against a defendant 
manufacturer for patent infringement.178  After the judgment in the trial 
was appealed, affirmed, and reversed in part, the case was remanded.179  
On remand, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the 
plaintiff from entering into evidence fourteen third-party declarations, 
and 148 documents purportedly self-authenticated by the declarations 
through Rule 902(11).180  In its analysis, the court noted the following: 
[T]he most appropriate way to view Rule 902(11) is as the functional 
equivalent of testimony offered to authenticate a business record 
tendered under Rule 803(6) because the declaration permitted by Rule 
902(11) serves the same purpose as authenticating testimony. 
Therefore, the declaration must satisfy the substantive criteria set forth 
in Rule 902(11) in order to lay a proper foundation for admission of 
the record.181 
The court held that the declarations did not permit self-
authentication of the business entity’s records because the declarations 
failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 902(11): the statements made 
no reference to the third-party’s knowledge of the manufacturers’ 
recordkeeping practices and whether the records were made by regularly 
conducted activity as regular practice.182   
Second, in In re Vee Vinhnee,183 the appellate bankruptcy panel 
relied on a merged Rule 902(11) and 803(6) analysis to uphold the trial 
bankruptcy judge’s decision to exclude evidence of electronic business 
 
 175. FED. R. EVID. 902(11). 
 176. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 571-72 (D. Md. 2007). 
 177. 348 F. Supp. 2d 698 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 178. Id. at 698. 
 179. Id. at 700. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 701. 
 182. Id. at 708. 
 183. 336 B.R. 437 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
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records.184  The court’s outcome hinged on the overall reliability of a 
declarant’s statement authenticating the records; the court noted 
dissatisfaction with the declarant’s knowledge of the hardware and 
software used to produce the information, and remarked that the 
declaration in no way established the declarant was “‘qualified’ to 
provide the requisite testimony[, and] . . . the declaration did not contain 
information sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the ‘ . . . computers 
[were] sufficiently accurate in the retention and retrieval of the 
information contained in the documents.’”185  Further, the court 
remarked that a “‘qualified’ witness or person under Rules 803(6) and 
902(11) need not be an expert,” but there would have to “be enough 
information presented to demonstrate that the person is sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the subject of the testimony.”186  The court did not 
find that the declarant possessed the requisite knowledge, for he “merely 
asserted” that he was “personally familiar with the hardware and 
software computer record-keeping systems,” and failed to “indicate his 
job title or anything about his training and experience that would import 
an aura of verisimilitude to his assertions.”187 
Following Lorraine, one court found that a declarant’s testimony 
failed to meet the requirements of Rule 902(11).  In United States v. 
Schultz,188 the defendant was charged with allegedly using a government 
credit card to purchase personal items.  The defendant’s lawyer 
contended that the defendant had committed the crimes because of 
mental health issues, which resulted from mistreatment she supposedly 
endured while training for and participating in the California National 
Guard.189  As evidence, defense counsel wanted to submit, inter alia, 
statements the defendant allegedly posted on Craig’s List discussing the 
alleged abuse.190   
The court initially declined to admit the defendant’s statement into 
evidence, finding that that statement failed to meet the relevancy 
requirement under Rule 402.191  Afterwards, the United States 
Government sought to have other sections of the Craig’s List postings 
 
 184. Id. at 444-50. 
 185. Id. at 448. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. No. Cr. S-07-76 KJM, 2008 WL 152132 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008). 
 189. Id. at *1. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 402). 
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admitted into evidence,192 and at a subsequent hearing, the court had to 
determine whether these sections were self-authenticating under Rule 
902(11)(A).193  Citing Rambus and United States v. Childs,194 the court 
found that the sections were not self-authenticating; the Government 
could not prove, “given the nature of the Craig’s List postings,” that the 
records had been “‘made at or near the time of the occurrence of the 
matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge of those matters.’”195   
4.  Self-Authentication of ESI under Rules 902(4) and 902(6) 
Although not specifically addressed in Lorraine,196 courts have 
begun to analyze the self-authentication of ESI under Rules 902(4) and 
902(6). 
a.  Rule 902(4) 
Rule 902(4) provides for self-authentication of the following: 
A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document 
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed 
in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as 
correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the 
certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of 
this rule or complying with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.197 
The primary purpose of Rule 902(4) is to make it unnecessary to 
remove original records from their official custody for litigation, for 
modern copying methods and the integrity of those certifying the copies 
offer some assurance against the possibilities of mistake or fraud.198  
Also, Rule 902(4)’s reference to “data compilations in any form” has 
been interpreted to include electronically stored or recorded data and 
 
 192. United States v. Schultz, No. Cr. S-07-76 KJM, 2008 WL 162164, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 
17, 2008). 
 193. Id. 
 194. 5 F.3d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that “exhibits can be admitted as business 
records of an entity, even when that entity was not the maker of those records, so long as the other 
requirements of Rule 803(6) are met and the circumstances indicate the records are trustworthy”). 
 195. Schultz, 2008 WL 162164, at *2 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 902(11)(A)). 
 196. See 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
 197. FED. R. EVID. 902(4). 
 198. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, §9:33, at 571. 
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computer output,199 and at least one case preceding Lorraine has 
discussed whether an electronic record could be self-authenticating 
under Rule 902(4).  In Brewer v. United States,200 the plaintiff failed to 
file tax returns for a number of years, prompting the Government to 
obtain liens on the plaintiff’s property, issue levies, and seize and sell the 
plaintiff’s property.201  Instead of challenging the merits of the tax 
assessments, the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title of his past wages, an 
annuity fund, and property in Florida and New York.202  In response, the 
Government filed a motion to dismiss.203 
The court granted the Government’s motion, and in doing so, relied 
on information contained in an Internal Revenue Service Form 4340, 
Certificate of Assessments and Payments, which was originally 
submitted by the Government as an attachment to the motion.204  The 
plaintiff had moved to strike the document, arguing that it was 
improperly authenticated and inadmissible hearsay.205  The court 
declined to agree with the plaintiff, and noted that “Form 4340 [was] a 
compilation of data stored in a computer, reflecting entries into an 
official record.”206  Additionally, the accompanying signature of a 
custodian “attest[ed] to the accuracy of the completed form,” thereby 
making it “properly admissible under Rule 902(4).”207  Such a finding 
highlights an important point when relying on Rule 902(4) when self-
authenticating ESI—as required by Rule 902(4), a proponent of ESI 
must still obtain a certificate of a custodian in order to ensure the 
information is true, accurate, and was properly recorded.  If not, then the 
ESI will not fall under the purview of Rule 902(4), and as a result, will 
not be self-authenticating.208 
 
 199. Id. at 572; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed 
rules (“The expression ‘data compilation’ is used as broadly descriptive of any means of storing 
information other than the conventional words and figures in written or documentary form.  It 
includes, but is by no means limited to, electronic computer storage.”). 
 200. 764 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
 201. Id. at 311. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 313. 
 204. Id. at 318. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See, e.g., In re Lebbos, No. 06-22225-D-7, 2008 WL 2474579, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
June 18, 2008). 
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b.  Rule 902(6) 
Rule 902(6) provides that printed materials, such as newspapers or 
periodicals, are self-authenticating.209  Contrary to the assertion made in 
Lorraine, one scholarly authority notes that because the rule references 
“printed” materials, it would be difficult to use Rule 902(6) to 
“authenticate electronic or hardcopy of material made available only 
over the Internet, such as Slate magazine, to wire service reports like 
Reuters.”210  One could also argue that the proliferation of electronic 
records defeats the original purpose of the rule itself; self-authentication 
under Rule 902(6) was permissible because it seemed exceedingly 
difficult to forge a newspaper or periodical because of distinct 
appearance, typeset, logo, and other discernible characteristics,211 but 
with the accessibility of electronic versions of such newspapers and 
periodicals, it would be much easier craft forgeries through the technical 
advancements of photo-editing software and/or data manipulation.212  
This troublesome, but perhaps resolvable aspect of relying on Rule 
902(6) to self-authenticate ESI was recently mentioned in Parikh v. 
Premera Blue Cross:213 
The problem the Court now faces is the fact that all of the newspaper 
or other periodical articles submitted by Defendant appear to have been 
printed from an internet media search service.  The original clippings, 
or even photocopies of the originals, are not provided.  Instead, the 
Court has merely received what appears to be the purported text of the 
articles typed into and printed from a computer.  There are no 
distinctive headlines, nor are there any unique typesetting techniques 
employed that would make these purported copies of original text 
difficult to forge.  Additionally, in many cases, the Court cannot tell 
from which internet service the documents were obtained.  The Court 
questioned the Defense attorney about these documents at oral 
argument and he admitted to the Court that he had no personal 
knowledge regarding where these documents were found on the 
internet because he had an assistant obtain these documents for him.  
 
 209. FED. R. EVID. 902(6).  
 210. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 20, § 902.02[4], at 902-10.  
 211. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, §9:35, at 592; See, e.g., Goguen ex rel. Estate 
of Goguen v. Textron, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 13, 17 n.2 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 212. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Even Better Than the Real Thing: How Courts Have Been 
Anything but Liberal in Finding Genuine Questions Raised as to the Authenticity of Originals under 
Rule 1003, 68 MD. L. REV. 160, 207-209 (2008). 
 213. No. C01-0476P, 2006 WL 2841998, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2006). 
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For these reasons, the Court must reject the articles submitted by 
Defendants as non-self-authenticating.214 
In an ESI context, such a ruling is a proverbial two-sided coin; 
attorneys should be aware that they cannot simply use a word processing 
program to retype a periodical into a computer and expect a court to 
recognize the output as self-authenticating under Rule 902(6), but they 
should also recognize that the court has provided a rough framework as 
to how online accessible periodicals can be self-authenticating under the 
federal rules.  First, a proponent would most likely have to show that the 
printout of the periodical came from the periodical’s website—this could 
be done by making sure the URL appears at the top of the printed page.  
Second, the proponent would most likely have to show to the court that 
the webpage of the online periodical uses a specific or particular font, 
which is comparable to the practices of most paper periodicals.  There 
would be, of course, additional considerations not considered by the 
Parikh court.  When analyzing issues involving the definition of 
“periodicals” under Rule 902(6), courts often focus on the printing 
schedule of the article, magazine, or newsletter to establish if the written 
piece is truly a “periodical” in the classical sense.215  Therefore, online 
versions of articles on the Newsweek website, which are posted on a 
predetermined basis, may soon be held to be self-authenticating under 
the rule, and a retyped article from a news blog will not.  Given the 
changes that the newspaper industry presently is undergoing, “online” 
publications by former “print-based” publishers can be expected to grow 
exponentially.  Lawyers and courts, therefore, will be called upon with 
greater regularity to rely on Rule 902(6) as a basis for authenticating 
these publications. 
IV.  THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS AS APPLIED TO 
ESI/DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
Lorraine also discusses at length the special challenges presented 
by the hearsay rule when applied to ESI or digital evidence.  As the 
opinion notes, the key to proper understanding of this issue hinges on a 
five-step analysis: 
The fourth “hurdle” that must be overcome when introducing 
electronic evidence is the potential application of the hearsay rule.  
 
 214. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
 215. See Goguen, 234 F.R.D. at 17-18. 
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Hearsay issues are pervasive when electronically stored and generated 
evidence is introduced.  To properly analyze hearsay issues there are 
five separate questions that must be answered:  (1) does the evidence 
constitute a statement, as defined by Rule 801(a); (2) was the 
statement made by a “declarant,” as defined by Rule 801(b); (3) is the 
statement being offered to prove the truth of its contents, as provided 
by Rule 801(c); (4) is the statement excluded from the definition of 
hearsay by rule 801(d); and (5) if the statement is hearsay, is it 
covered by one of the exceptions identified at Rules 803, 804 or 807.  
It is critical to proper hearsay analysis to consider each of these 
questions.216 
Lorraine explains that the core purpose of the hearsay rule is to 
ensure sufficient reliability of testimonial evidence that asserts the 
existence of facts and invites the finder of fact to accept them as true, 
and recognizes the four common law “testimonial risks” that the hearsay 
rule is designed to address: perception, memory, sincerity, and 
narration.217  The hearsay rules accomplish this by insisting on the 
presence before the jury of the person making the assertions, so that his 
credibility may be assessed through testimony given under oath, tested 
by cross-examination, with the jury in a position to observe the 
demeanor of the witness during the process.218  Central to this concept is 
the requirement in Rule 801(a) of a “statement,” which is a term of art 
with a specific meaning—written or spoken utterances (referred to as 
“verbal conduct”) as well as non-verbal conduct that is expressly 
intended by the actor to be assertive.219  The Lorraine opinion notes the 
irony of the fact that despite its paramount importance to the operation 
of the hearsay rule, the word “assertion” is not defined by the Rule 801, 
but offers the following practical definition: “An assertion usefully may 
be defined as ‘to state as true; declare; maintain.’”220   
The next requirement of the hearsay rule is that the statement be 
made by a human being, referred to by Rule 801(b) as the “declarant,” 
and this is particularly relevant to ESI/digital evidence, and the source of 
much confusion.221  When ESI or digital evidence is produced from a 
computer or other electronic device, it may be either “computer 
 
 216. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 562-63. 
 217. Id. at 563 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed 
rules). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (citation omitted). 
 220. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 106 (5th ed. 1979)). 
 221. Id. at 564-65. 
41
Grimm et al.: Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
7-GRIMM_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:19 PM 
398 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:357 
  
generated” or “computer stored.”222  The difference is significant for 
purposes of the hearsay rule, and George Paul’s recent treatise on digital 
evidence has explained it quite well: 
[C]ourts and commentators have recognized a distinction between 
computer-generated and computer-stored evidence.  If the system 
made the statement, it is “computer-generated.”  If a person input a 
statement into the system that then preserved a record of it, it is 
“computer-stored” evidence.  Underlying the distinction is the idea that 
computer-stored evidence is a repetition of data originally entered by a 
human language writer, while computer-generated evidence is the 
product of electronic processes, or the statements an information 
system makes in its reading and writing games.223   
Thus, as Lorraine notes, if the electronic or digital evidence was 
not created by a human declarant, then it cannot constitute hearsay, and 
courts have repeatedly overruled hearsay objections aimed at excluding 
“assertive” statements generated by a computer or machine, not a 
human.224  Since Lorraine, courts have continued to recognize the 
requirement of a “human” declarant before factual statements generated 
by computers or other machines may be regarded as hearsay.225 
While Lorraine and the cases cited in the opinion conclude that 
computer-generated statements do not constitute hearsay, they are quick 
to caution that this does not mean the evidence gets a “free pass” to 
admissibility.  To the contrary, because the statements are computer- or 
machine-generated, they are only admissible if reliable, meaning that 
they must be the product of a system or process that is capable of 
 
 222. PAUL, supra note 5, at 115. 
 223. Id. at 115-16 (citing Tatum v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 133 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 224. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 564-65 (citing United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (header of a faxed document not hearsay because hearsay rule requires that the statement 
be “uttered by ‘a person,’” so nothing “said” by a machine is hearsay); United States v. Rollins, No. 
ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003) (computer generated 
records are not hearsay), rev’d in part on other grounds, 61 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 2005); State v. 
Dunn, 7 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (computer generated billing record not hearsay); 
State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 147 (Tenn. 1998) (computer generated records are not hearsay 
because they are not statements of a witness)).. 
 225. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
machine-generated data produced by forensic laboratory equipment that reflected blood alcohol 
level of defendant and presence of PCP not hearsay because they were not made by human 
declarant, but rather were generated by machine’s diagnostic and technical analysis of defendant’s 
blood). 
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producing a reliable result,226 which is a function of the authentication 
rules, specifically Rule 901(b)(9).227   
Despite the analysis in Lorraine, the cases cited therein, and the 
authorities referenced in this Article, not all courts are so quick to draw 
the admittedly subtle distinction between computer-generated and 
computer-stored statements for purposes of determining whether the 
records produced by the computer are “statements” made by a “human 
declarant” for purposes of application of the hearsay rule.  Rather, they 
assume without analysis that the record generated by the computer is 
hearsay because it contains factual assertions, but then admit it under 
one of the many hearsay exceptions that cover various records or 
documents.228  As George Paul has observed:  
However, in some cases, courts simply assume that computer-
generated information is hearsay, without performing an analysis, 
seemingly avoiding the preliminary issue [of whether the information 
constitutes the “statement” of a “human declarant”].  These courts 
analyze objections to admissibility by searching for a hearsay 
 
 226. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 565 (citing Rollins, 2004 WL 26780, at *9; Dunn, 7 S.W.3d at 
432; Hall, 976 S.W.2d at 147). 
Any concerns about the reliability of such machine-generated information is addressed 
through the process of authentication not by hearsay or Confrontation Clause analysis.  
When information provided by machines is mainly a product of “mechanical 
measurement or manipulation of data by well-accepted scientific or mathematical 
techniques,” reliability concerns are addressed by requiring the proponent to show that 
the machine and its functions are reliable, that it was correctly adjusted or calibrated, and 
that the data . . . put into the machine was accurate . . . . In other words, a foundation 
must be established for the information through authentication, which Federal Rule of 
Evidence 901(b)(9) allows such proof to be authenticated by evidence “describing [the] 
process or system used to produce [the] result’ and showing it ‘produces an accurate 
result.” 
Washington, 498 F.3d at 231.  See also SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 10 
(“System metadata does not constitute ‘hearsay,’ at least not under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
because system metadata is generated by a computer without human assistance.  The reason is that 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence ‘hearsay,’ by definition, requires human input.”). 
 227. FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (“By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this 
rule: . . . (9) Process or system.  Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result 
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.”). 
 228. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568 (noting the following hearsay exceptions recognized by FED. 
R. EVID. 803 for documents, records and other writings: 803(5) (past recollection recorded); 803(6) 
& (7) (business records); 803 (8) & (10) (public records); 803(9) (records of vital statistics); 803(11) 
(records of religious organizations); 803(12) (certificates of baptism, marriage, and related events); 
803(13) (family records); 803(14) (records of documents affecting an interest in property); 803(15) 
(statements in documents affecting an interest in property); 803(16) ancient documents); 803(18) 
(learned treatises)). 
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exception, which they nearly always find.  And courts that hold that 
computer-generated information is hearsay often complicate matters by 
using the term ‘computer-generated information’ loosely, lumping all 
evidence that comes from a computer together, and failing to focus on 
whether what is really at issue is computer-stored information—often 
usually hearsay under anyone’s definition.229 
The take-away lesson from Lorraine’s discussion of Rule 801(b) as 
it applies to electronic or digital evidence is that adherence to the five 
step analysis the opinion describes will ensure that the correct result is 
achieved—proper distinction between computer-stored statements 
initiated by a human declarant, which are excluded unless covered by a 
hearsay exception, and computer-generated non-hearsay statements, that 
are not admissible unless authenticated by showing that they were 
generated by a system or process capable of producing a reliable 
result.230 
The Lorraine opinion further notes that the third requirement of the 
hearsay rule is that the “statement” at issue be offered into evidence to 
prove its substantive truth, or as Rule 801(c) puts it, hearsay “is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”231  So, for example, if evidence that would constitute a 
“statement” under Rule 801(a), is made by a human declarant as 
required by 801(b) but is offered for some purpose other than its literal 
truth, it cannot be hearsay.  Examples of when a statement is not offered 
for its substantive truth, but may be relevant for some other purpose, 
include those offered to prove the communicative or comprehensive 
capacity of the declarant, those offered as circumstantial evidence of the 
state of mind of the declarant, statements that are offered not for their 
truth but instead to show the conduct of someone who heard them, (to 
prove that they had knowledge of the information, or to explain what 
they did after having heard it), statements that constitute “verbal acts” or 
parts of acts, and statements that have relevance even if not true.232   
The Lorraine opinion also cites examples where ESI/digital 
evidence that might at first blush be regarded as hearsay was found not 
to be: e-mail evidence between a co-worker and the defendant was held 
not to be hearsay because it was not offered for its truth, but merely to 
 
 229. PAUL, supra note 5, at 119 (citations omitted). 
 230. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
 231. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 565 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c)) (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. at 565-66.  
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demonstrate that a relationship existed between the sender and 
recipient;233 e-mails were admitted as non-hearsay in a criminal case 
because they were not offered for their substantive truth, but rather to 
show how a lobbyist attempted to influence a government official, and to 
prove the official’s intent and state of mind;234 and exhibits showing the 
defendant’s website content on a particular day were not hearsay, 
because they were not offered to prove their literal truth, but rather to 
prove that they infringed on plaintiff’s trademark and copyright.235  
Given the frequency with which circumstantial evidence is offered to 
prove a party’s state of mind, it may be expected that ESI/digital 
evidence such as e-mail, instant messages, and text messages will be 
offered for this purpose, and if not also offered for the truth of these 
statements, such use would remove the evidence from the reach of the 
hearsay rule.  Similarly, as the hypothetical at the start of this Article 
illustrates, evidence of the content of web sites also is likely to be 
offered into evidence for reasons other than its literal truth, for example, 
to prove that the contents were false, inaccurate, or misleading.  
Similarly, website content may also be offered to prove violations of 
copyright or trademark protection, to demonstrate unfair competition, or 
to prove the publication of defamatory statements.  In each of these 
examples, the content of the website would not be offered for its 
substantive truth, and thus would not be hearsay. 
Lorraine further notes that the final step to determining whether 
ESI/digital evidence is hearsay is to see if the evidence is exempted from 
the definition of hearsay by Rule 801(d).  That rule identifies two 
categories of out of court statements: certain “prior statements” by 
witnesses who actually testify at trial and are susceptible to cross 
examination about the earlier statement, under Rule 801(d)(1), and 
admissions by party opponents, under Rule 801(d)(2).236  As for Rule 
801(d)(2), it can be expected that admissions will frequently be proved 
by ESI/digital evidence, because the use of electronic communication is 
ubiquitous. Indeed, the spontaneity and informality of e-mail, text 
messaging, and instant messaging may make these forms of digital 
evidence especially good candidates for evidentiary admissions, and 
 
 233. Id. at 566 (citing United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 234. Id. (citing United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
 235. Id. (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002)). 
 236. Id. at 567 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2)). 
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courts are already familiar with the introduction of digital admissions 
such as e-mail.237 
A.  Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions 
While the Lorraine opinion stresses the importance of the four step 
analysis to properly determine whether digital evidence is hearsay in the 
first instance,238 it also reminds us that a determination that digital 
evidence is hearsay is, in a sense, only the start of the analysis, for there 
is no shortage of hearsay exceptions that courts have applied to ESI: 
If, after applying the foregoing four-step analysis, it is determined that 
the electronic evidence constitutes a statement by a person that is 
offered for its substantive truth and is not excluded from the definition 
of hearsay by Rule 801(d)(1) or (2), then the evidence is hearsay and is 
inadmissible unless it qualifies as one of many hearsay exceptions 
identified by Rule 803, 804 and 807.239   
Focusing first on Rule 803, the Lorraine opinion notes that there 
are twenty-three separate exceptions, sharing the common characteristic 
that “[a]ll twenty-three are admissible regardless of whether the 
declarant is available to testify.”240  The opinion points out that despite 
the large number of exceptions in Rule 803, they may usefully be 
grouped into three categories: (1) those dealing with perceptions, 
observations, state of mind, intent and sensation;241 (2) exceptions that 
involve documents, records, and other writings;242 and (3) statements 
 
 237. See, e.g., Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1323 (holding the e-mail defendant authored was not 
hearsay because it was an admission); Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44 (holding the e-mail sent 
by defendant was an admission, therefore not hearsay); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar 
Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3292, 2004 WL 2367740, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding the images and 
text posted on defendant’s website were admissions, not hearsay); Perfect 10, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1153-55 (holding the e-mail sent by employees of defendant constituted admissions under Rule 
801(d)(2)(D)); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568.  
 238. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 562-63. 
 239. Id. at 568. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(1), present sense impressions, FED. R. EVID. 803(2), excited 
utterances, FED. R. EVID. 803(3), then existing state of mind, condition or sensation, and FED. R. 
EVID. 803(4), statements in furtherance of medical diagnosis and treatment). 
 242. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (past recollection recorded); FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(7), 
(dealing with business records); FED. R. EVID. 803(8) & (10) (dealing with public records); FED. R. 
EVID. 803(9) (records of vital statistics); FED. R. EVID. 803(11) (records of religious organizations); 
FED. R. EVID. 803(12) (certificates of baptism, marriage, and related events); FED. R. EVID. 803(13), 
(family records); FED. R. EVID. 803(14) (records affecting an interest in property); FED. R. EVID. 
803(15) (statements in documents affecting an interest in property); FED. R. EVID. 803(16) (ancient 
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dealing with reputation.243  With respect to these three categories of 
exceptions, the court observed:  
Given the widely accepted fact that most writings today are created 
and stored in electronic format, it is easy to see that the many types of 
documents and writings covered in Rule 803 will implicate electronic 
writings.  Similarly, given the ubiquity of communications in 
electronic media (e-mail, text messages, chat rooms, internet posting 
on servers like “Myspace” or “Youtube” or on blogs, voice mail, etc.), 
it is not surprising that many statements involving observations of 
events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans 
and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physical) will be 
communicated in electronic medium.244  
Despite the large number of exceptions contained in Rule 803,  
Lorraine notes only a handful of exceptions frequently have been 
invoked in connection with digital evidence, most of them found in Rule 
803.245  One of these exceptions, 803(1), deals with present sense 
impressions, which are statements describing or explaining an event 
while it is being perceived, or immediately thereafter.246  Anyone who 
has ever had a telephone conversation with someone and heard them 
typing on a computer while they are talking, or sent an e-mail, instant 
message, or text message to another describing an event as it was 
happening or immediately thereafter can imagine how often this hearsay 
exception may be applicable to ESI/digital evidence.  Similarly, 
Lorraine points out that Rules 803(2) (excited utterances) and 803(3) 
(then existing state of mind or condition) also can be expected to apply 
to digital evidence with some frequency.247  Courts can be expected to 
apply the same level of scrutiny to ESI/digital evidence as they had in 
the past applied to “paper” documents in determining whether the 
 
documents); FED. R. EVID. 803(17) (market compilations and directories); FED. R. EVID. 803(18) 
(learned treatises); FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (dealing with judgments of conviction in criminal cases); 
FED. R. EVID. 803(23) (dealing with judgments in certain civil cases)). 
 243. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(19) (reputation regarding personal or family history); FED. 
R. EVID. 803(20) (reputation regarding land custom, use and practice associated with land, and 
historically significant facts); FED. R. EVID. 803(21) (reputation regarding character within the 
community and among associates)). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 569. 
 246. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 247. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 569-570.   
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foundational requirements of hearsay exceptions have been 
established.248 
1.  Business Records Exception under Rule 803(6) 
The business records exception found at Rule 803(6) is another 
frequently used basis for admitting digital evidence: 
The business record exception is one of the hearsay exceptions most 
discussed by courts when ruling on the admissibility of electronic 
evidence.  The decisions demonstrate a continuum running from cases 
where the court was very lenient in admitting electronic business 
records, without demanding analysis, to those in which the court took a 
very demanding approach and scrupulously analyzed every element of 
the exception, and excluded evidence when all were not met.249   
The Lorraine opinion concludes:  
The lesson to be taken from these cases is that some courts will require 
the proponent of electronic business records or e-mail evidence to 
 
 248. Id. (citing United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp 90 (D. Mass. 1997) (concluding that an e-
mail from employee to a supervisor qualified as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1), but 
did not qualify as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), simply because the e-mail ended with the 
words “my mind is mush”); New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL 
649951, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (concluding that an e-mail that described the contents of a 
telephone conference sent several days after the call did not qualify as a present sense impression 
under Rule 803(1) because it was not made contemporaneously with, or immediately after the call)); 
but see Canatxx Gas Storage Ltd. v. Silverhawk Capital Partners, LLC., No. H-06-1330, 2008 WL 
1999234, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2008) (noting “[e]mail is admissible under the present-sense 
impression exception to the hearsay rule” if there is sufficient contemporaneousness of the event 
and the e-mail describing it). 
 249. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 572; see, e.g., United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App’x 264, 265 
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the business record exception was established for computer-generated 
records by the testimony of a witness familiar with the record keeping system of the business); Sea-
Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, 285 F.3d 808, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that digital records 
were admissible as business records on showing that they had been produced from same electronic 
information generated at the time the contract was created, and noting that “it is immaterial that the 
business record is maintained in a computer rather than in company books”); contra Microsoft 
Corp., 2002 WL 649951, *2 (holding that an employee e-mail did not qualify as business record 
without a showing that it was the regular practice of the employer to require the employee to make 
and maintain the e-mail for a business purpose, and requiring that, for e-mail chains, each 
participant must be acting in the regular course of the business in contributing to the e-mail chain); 
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 348 F .Supp. 2d 698, 706-707 (E.D. Va. 2004) (requiring that 
each participant in an e-mail chain must be acting in the course of the business’s regular activities in 
order for the chain to qualify as a business record); In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 445 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2005) (utilizing a very demanding approach in assessing whether computer generated credit 
card records were business records, and expressing concern about the possibility that records could 
have been altered or modified after being scanned into computerized database).   
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make an enhanced showing in addition to meeting each element of the 
business records exception.  These courts are concerned that the 
information generated for use in litigation may have been altered, 
changed or manipulated after its initial input, or that the programs and 
procedures used to create and maintain the records are not reliable or 
accurate.250  
Courts that appreciate that employees often use their business 
computer to send personal e-mails are more likely to be inclined to 
require strict adherence to each element of Rule 803(6) before they are 
willing to admit e-mail as a business record.  A good example of such a 
case, decided after Lorraine, is Canatxx Gas Storage Limited v. 
Silverhawk Capital Partners, LLC.,251 where the court held:  
Neither a paper document, such as a letter or memo or note, nor an 
email, falls within the business-records exception of Rule 803(6) 
simply because it concerns a business matter.  Courts have held that 
conventional letters, memos, or notes are admissible under the business 
records exception if they are regularly made in furtherance of the 
employer’s needs and not for the personal purposes of the employee 
who made them.  Courts have applied a similar approach to emails.  A 
party seeking to introduce an email made by an employee about a 
business matter under the hearsay exception under Rule 803(6) must 
show that the employer imposed a business duty to make and maintain 
such a record.  Courts examine whether it was the business duty of an 
employee to make and maintain emails as part of his job duties and 
whether the employee routinely sent or received and maintained the 
emails.252  
This is an important point.  As demonstrated above, many forms of 
digital communication that are associated with personal communications 
have migrated into the business arena, including text messages, 
blogging, and instant messaging.  Courts can be expected to require the 
proponent of such evidence to make a clear showing that the digital 
evidence relates to a regular activity of the business itself, as opposed to 
the personal use of its creator, and that the business imposed on the 
employee a requirement to make a digital record of the occurrence, and 
thereafter to maintain that record for purposes of the future use by the 
company.  This raises an interesting issue.  Many organizations and 
businesses have electronic records management systems in place that 
 
 250. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 574. 
 251. 2008 WL 1999234. 
 252. Id. at *12 (citations omitted). 
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automatically delete e-mails after a specific period, such as ninety 
days.253  In such instances, unless the organization or business also 
requires that certain types of e-mail that are important to the effective 
operation of the organization are maintained in a saved file for future 
business purposes, then it may be difficult to prove that they constitute 
business records, because Rule 803(6) requires that they be “kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity.”254  It may be difficult 
to show that the e-mail are “kept” for a “business activity” if they are 
routinely and automatically deleted without being saved to a file where 
they will continue to be available for business purposes. 
In addition to the question of whether e-mail or other digital records 
meet the requirements of Rule 803(6) that they be made for a business 
purpose, a number of commentators have expressed grave concern that 
when it comes to computerized evidence, there has been a significant 
erosion of the requirement that a business record be the product of a 
trustworthy process.  This requirement is explicit in the rule itself, which 
provides that even if the record is made for a business purpose, 
contemporaneously with the events described within, by someone with 
personal knowledge of those facts, and the regularity requirements are 
met, the record nonetheless must be excluded if “the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack 
of trustworthiness.”255  In his book, George Paul meticulously lays out 
exactly what the problem is when the trustworthiness requirement of the 
business record exception is overlooked and the regularity requirement 
is the only criterion for admissibility of digital evidence:  
Now, regularity of preparation has become the key to admitting 
business records including records containing computer-generated 
information.  And if regularity is the test, almost any computer-
generated information qualifies, without any showing of reliability.  
Accordingly, both the hearsay rule—and the main exception used to 
test admissibility of statements of information systems under it—
become trivial, without any meaningful competency determination by 
a court.  The ability to exclude out-of-court statements, the hearsay 
rule, appears to have largely evaporated with regard to computer-
generated information.  Rather, in almost every case, all computer 
 
 253. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s notes to the 2006 amendments 
(noting the revised rule “focuses on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the routine 
alteration and deletion of information that attends ordinary use”). 
 254. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (emphasis added). 
 255. Id.  
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evidence is admitted and things go to weight of the evidence.  That 
may be our final, preferred policy, after rule makers and thinkers 
address this issue during the coming years, but in the meantime 
practitioners should acknowledge the reality of where the law has 
drifted.256   
George Paul further observes that: 
[C]ourts also now overlook the caveat in Rule 803(6) that allows 
admission ‘unless the source of the information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.’  Courts 
overwhelmingly find that problems concerning the accuracy of 
computer-generated evidence go to the weight of the evidence, not 
admissibility.257   
There is, however, a problem with this approach: 
When courts exclude both the trustworthiness caveat from their 803(6) 
foundational inquiry, and an explicit preliminary authenticity analysis 
as a prerequisite for admission, there is a high probability (if not 
certainty) that any out-of-court statement made by an information 
system will be admitted. This is significant, because jurors give 
computer-generated evidence a high level of credibility, much as 
scientific evidence is interpreted by jurors to have an “aura of 
credibility.”258 
George Paul concludes with this cautionary observation:  
Clearly, when applying the rationale of the business records exception 
to computer generated evidence, “important differences” have “eluded 
consideration.”  For example, computer-generated evidence does not 
become more accurate from “regularity of preparation.”  Unlike 
humans, where repeated action trains an individual ‘in habits of 
precision,’ computers do not become more accurate each time they 
produce a result. . . . 
 
Just because businesses rely on faulty computer programs does not 
necessarily mean that courts should follow suit.  Without requiring 
some preliminary showing of reliability, a court will simply have no 
idea what caliber of information system produced the result or what 
measures, if any, the business took to protect the integrity of the 
system.  When considering the duty judges have to ensure the accuracy 
 
 256. PAUL, supra note 5, at 120. 
 257. Id. at 125 (citations omitted). 
 258. Id. at 125-26. 
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of evidence considered by the jury, blindly admitting computer-
generated evidence without any foundation is a system that, in essence, 
does away with the hearsay rule and that allows everything to go to the 
weight.259   
George Paul is not alone in his concern that courts have become too 
lax in admitting computer-generated evidence as business records 
without a sufficient showing of the reliability of the system that 
produced them.  The Commentary of the widely respected Sedona 
Conference regarding ESI evidence and admissibility,260 also published 
after the issuance of the Lorraine opinion, raises similar concerns.  It 
stresses the importance of being aware that ESI/digital evidence is 
prepared, stored and used within a “threat landscape” that includes the 
availability of “anti-forensics.”261 The Commentary raises the following 
warning: 
Courts and litigants need to become familiar with anti-forensic tools 
and not become bedazzled by technology, which some fear is 
occurring.  In a paper that appeared in the Journal of Digital Forensic 
Practice, Vincent Liu and coauthor Eric Van Buskirk flout the U.S. 
courts’ faith in digital forensic evidence.  Liu and Van Buskirk cite a 
litany of cases that established, as one judge put it, computer records’ 
“prima facie aura of reliability.”  One decision even stated that 
computer records were “uniquely reliable in that they were computer-
generated rather than the result of human entries.”  Liu and Van 
Buskirk take exception to this viewpoint.  The “unfortunate truth” they 
conclude, is that the presumption of reliability is unjustified and the 
justice system is “not sufficiently skeptical of that which is offered up 
as proof.”262 
The Lorraine decision did not involve a challenge to the 
admissibility of ESI/digital evidence offered as a business record, and its 
discussion of the cases that had, to date, analyzed this important hearsay 
exception in the context of such evidence pointed out the continuum of 
cases where courts have shown, at times, both extreme deference as well 
as hostility to admitting digital evidence under this exception.  The 
 
 259. Id. at 129. 
 260. SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY, supra note 4. 
 261. Anti-forensics is defined as “the employment of sophisticated tools and methods used for 
the intentional fabrication and/or manipulation of ESI on a computer system intended to thwart 
forensic examination.  In short, anti-forensics is digital forgery.”  Id. at 16. 
 262. Id. (quoting Eric Van Buskirk & Vincent T. Liu, Digital Evidence: Challenging the 
Presumption of Reliability, 1 J. DIGITAL FORENSICS PRACTICE 19, 25 (2006)). 
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important lesson to be learned for the future development of this critical 
area of evidence law is that the concerns raised by George Paul’s book 
and the Sedona Conference Commentary generate a wake-up call to both 
judges and lawyers to more carefully consider these issues.  The primary 
obligation for doing so rests with the lawyers, as they must be the ones 
to identify reliability/trustworthiness problems with digital business 
records, develop the facts to challenge them, and argue to the courts why 
the exception is inapplicable and why the proffered evidence should be 
excluded.  As part of this process they must be able to distinguish those 
cases which have, as noted by George Paul and the Sedona Conference 
Commentary, unjustifiably assumed that the digital records were reliable 
and admitted them without skeptical analysis.  Thereafter, it is the 
responsibility of the courts to carefully consider whether the challenges 
have merit, and address this on a case-specific basis, as opposed to 
adopting a categorical approach that assumes reliability simply because 
the evidence was computer-generated.  The importance of making an 
objection in the first instance, however, cannot be underscored enough, 
as the Lorraine case noted:  
What, then, is the effect of hearsay evidence that is admitted without 
objection by the party against whom it is offered?  The general rule is 
that despite Rule 802, if hearsay is admitted without objection it may 
be afforded its “natural probative effect, as if it were in law 
admissible.”263 
2.  Public Records Exception under Rule 803(8)  
Another hearsay exception that the Lorraine opinion recognized as 
likely to be applied with regard to ESI/digital evidence is Rule 803(8), 
the public records exception.264  This is an important exception because 
of the ease with which it may be employed and the minimal foundation 
needed to establish it.265  As noted in, Williams, the rationale for the 
public records exception is as follows: 
Justification for this exception derives from the trustworthiness of the 
documents themselves, having been made by a public office or agency, 
as well as the inherent necessity to avoid requiring public officials to 
needlessly testify as witnesses about reports, data compilations, 
 
 263. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 575 (D. Md. 2007). 
 264. Id. at 574. 
 265. See supra Part III. 
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records or statements made in their official capacities.  The documents 
are considered trustworthy due to the “duty that comes with public 
service,” and it is presumed that public officials execute their tasks 
“carefully and fairly, without bias or corruption, and this notion finds 
support in the scrutiny and risk of exposure that surround most 
government functions.”  Absent the exception found at Rule 803(8), 
lawyers seeking to prove facts contained within official records would 
be forced to call public officials as witnesses to provide testimony 
regarding the contents of the official records.  This would, of course, 
be burdensome and divert the efforts of officials called as witnesses 
from performing their public duties.266      
In Williams, the public records that were determined to be 
admissible were websites from two state agencies.267  Because nearly all 
local, state, and federal agencies have their own websites these days, and 
those sites frequently contain significant amounts of factual information 
that may be relevant to the resolution of litigation involving those 
agencies, or private parties, it may be expected that Rule 803(8) will 
prove particularly useful as a hearsay exception to permit the admission 
into evidence of matters contained within those websites.  Indeed, the 
hypothetical that started this Article illustrates this, and the postings on 
the FTC website regarding unfair business practices of ConsumerPro are 
likely to be relevant to consumer actions against that company and the 
contract claim filed against it by Tele-Sales.  Other types of ESI/digital 
evidence that the Lorraine opinion noted had been admitted into 
evidence under the public records exception include e-mail from public 
agencies268 and computerized records of a public agency.269 
B.  Rule 804 Hearsay Exceptions 
The Lorraine opinion did not discuss the potential applicability of 
the hearsay exceptions found at Rule 804 to ESI/digital evidence.  These 
exceptions are far fewer in number than those found in Rule 803270 and 
 
 266. Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 690-91 (D. Md. 2008) (quoting MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, § 8:86, at 770-72) (citations omitted). 
 267. Id. at 682. 
 268.  Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 575 (citing Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
 269. Id. (citing United States v. Oceguerra-Aguirre, 70 F. App’x 473 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 270. There are only five exceptions found in Rule 804.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former 
testimony of an unavailable declarant); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (dying declarations); FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(3) (statements against penal, pecuniary, or proprietary interest); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4) 
(statements of an unavailable declarant regarding his or her personal or family history); FED. R. 
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require an extra foundational step beyond those found in Rule 803.  All 
of the Rule 804 hearsay exceptions require that the proponent 
demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, and Rule 
804(a) identifies five circumstances in which this can occur.271  While 
research has failed to disclose examples of when courts have admitted 
ESI/digital evidence under the Rule 804 exceptions, it is not difficult to 
imagine circumstances in which they might be willing to do so.  First, as 
most trials and depositions are recorded electronically, or on video, 
introduction of prior trial or deposition testimony of an unavailable 
declarant under Rule 804(b)(1) inevitably involves ESI/digital evidence.  
Similarly, given the ubiquity of cell phones and personal digital 
assistants, it is not difficult to imagine that a person who has been the 
subject of a fatal or near fatal assault would make a cell phone call that 
would meet the requirements of a dying declaration under Rule 
804(b)(2).  Further, the underlying facts in Crawford v. Washington,272 
the recent landmark confrontation clause case, involved a recorded 
statement of the defendant’s wife, who later asserted the marital 
privilege and was unavailable for trial,273 and in the state court 
prosecution the state introduced the recorded statement into evidence 
under the state equivalent of Rule 804(b)(3), a statement against penal 
interest.274  And, finally, it would not be hard to imagine a situation in 
which a defendant in a criminal case sends a text message to a potential 
witness against him threatening the witness if she testifies, and the 
witness, in turn, sends a text message, or e-mail, or leaves a voicemail 
message to another person which details the threat, as well as the 
criminal activity of the defendant which led to it.  In such a situation, the 
digital communication sent by the witness likely would be admissible 
under Rule 804(b)(6), if the witness was unavailable to testify at trial 
because of the defendant’s threat.     
 
EVID. 804(b)(6) (statements of an unavailable declarant that are admitted against a party whose 
wrongful conduct caused the declarant to be unavailable). 
 271. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1) (declarant asserts a privilege and therefore cannot be 
compelled to  testify); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2) (declarant refuses to testify, despite being ordered to 
do so by the court); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) (declarant lacks sufficient memory to be able to testify 
fully and completely); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4) (declarant cannot testify because of death, illness, or 
incapacity); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5) (beyond the ability of the court to compel the declarant to 
appear and testify). 
 272. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 273. Id. at 40. 
 274. Id. 
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V.  THE ORIGINAL WRITING RULE AS APPLIED TO ESI/DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE 
The Lorraine opinion also provides an analytical framework for 
how the collection of evidence rules commonly known as the “best 
evidence” or “original writing rules” operate in the realm of electronic or 
digital evidence.275  The opinion notes that the structure of the original 
writing rules is important to understand to ensure their proper 
application.  Rule 1001 contains a series of definitions: “original,” 
“duplicate,” “writing,” “recording,” and “photograph,” and as they apply 
to ESI/digital evidence, the most important definition is found at Rule 
1001(3), which states, “[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar 
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect 
the data accurately, is an ‘original.’”276  Thus, “the ‘original’ of 
information stored in a computer is the readable display of the 
information on the computer screen, the hard drive or other source where 
it is stored, as well as any printout or output that may be read so long as 
it accurately reflects the data.”277  Further, as a result of Rule 1003, 
which provides that duplicates are co-extensively admissible as 
originals, unless unauthentic or prepared under circumstances that would 
make it unfair to admit them, “the distinction between duplicates and 
originals largely has become unimportant.”278 
Lorraine discusses when the original writing rule applies in the first 
instance–the rule is inapplicable unless a party is seeking to prove the 
“contents” of a writing, recording, or photograph.279  If a digital 
document describes an event the occurrence of which may be proved by 
the testimony of witnesses who observed it, the original writing rule is 
inapplicable, and would not require introduction of the document in lieu 
of the testimony of the witnesses.280  In contrast, if there is no non-
documentary proof of the occurrence, and the only evidence of what 
transpired is contained in a writing, then the original writing rule 
applies.281  Similarly, as in the hypothetical that began this Article, if the 
 
 275. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567-83. 
 276. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3). 
 277. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 577-78 (citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 
900.07[1][d][iv]; PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 194 (ABA Publishing 
2005); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 278. Id. at 578. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
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contents of a website at a particular date are important to establish the 
false or inaccurate information that the consumers saw when they 
accessed the ConsumerPro website, then the original writing rule would 
apply, because the plaintiffs would be seeking to prove the “content” of 
the website at that particular time. 
Lorraine notes that when the rule applies, it creates a hierarchy of 
evidence that may be used to prove the contents of a writing, recording, 
or photograph: an original or duplicate, and if not available, then by 
“secondary evidence,” which is defined as “any proof of the contents of 
a writing, recording or photograph other than an original or duplicate . . . 
[including] testimony from the author of the writing, or someone who 
read it, earlier drafts, copies, or an outline used to prepare the final 
[draft].”282  Given the ephemeral nature of ESI, and the fact that it may 
be deleted, overwritten, or otherwise inaccessible, secondary evidence 
often must be used to prove the content of ESI/digital evidence.  As the 
Lorraine opinion notes:  
Given the myriad ways that electronic records may be deleted, lost as a 
result of system malfunctions, purged as a result of routine electronic 
records management software (such as the automatic deletion of e-mail 
after a set time period) or otherwise unavailable means that the 
contents of electronic writings may have to be proved by secondary 
evidence.283 
The Lorraine opinion explains that when secondary evidence must 
be used to prove the contents of ESI/digital evidence, then there are a 
series of rules that govern.284  The primary rule is Rule 1004, which 
permits secondary evidence to prove the contents of ESI in four 
circumstances: (a) when the originals or duplicates have been lost or 
destroyed, absent any bad faith by their proponent; (b) if the originals or 
duplicates are not obtainable by judicial process or procedure; (c) if the 
originals or duplicates are in the possession, custody or control of an 
adverse party who is on notice by the pleadings or otherwise that their 
contents would be the subject of proof at a trial or hearing and who does 
not bring them; or (d) the documents are “collateral” to the litigation, 
meaning that they do not closely relate to a controlling issue in the 
litigation.285  Other rules that permit secondary evidence to prove the 
 
 282. Id. at 576. 
 283. Id. at 580. 
 284. Id. at 576 (citing FED. R. EVID. 1004-07). 
 285.  FED. R. EVID. 1004; see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 579-80. 
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contents of documents include Rule 1006, which permits the 
introduction of summaries of voluminous writings, recordings, or 
photographs, and Rule 1007, which allows the proof of the contents of a 
writing, recording, or photograph through the testimonial admission of 
an adverse party.286  Rule 1006 is especially important with respect to 
ESI/digital evidence, and the Lorraine opinion points out that “[b]ecause 
the production of electronically stored information in civil cases 
frequently is voluminous, the use of summaries under Rule 1006 is a 
particularly useful evidentiary tool, and courts can be expected to allow 
the use of summaries provided the procedural requirements of the rule 
are met.”287 
Finally, the Lorraine opinion discusses an important, but frequently 
overlooked rule, Rule 1008, which is a particular application of the 
conditional relevance rule.288  The opinion notes that Rule 1008 “is a 
specialized application of Rule 104(b), and it allocates the responsibility 
between the trial judge and the jury with respect to certain preliminary 
matters affecting the original writing rule.”289  As the Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 1008 states,   
Most preliminary questions of fact in connection with applying the rule 
preferring the original as evidence of contents are for the judge, under . 
. . Rule 104(a).  Thus, the question whether the loss of the originals has 
been established, or of the fulfillment of other conditions specified in 
Rule 1004 . . . is for the judge.290   
However, the Advisory Committee Notes also state: 
Rule 1008 identifies three issues that are questions for the jury . . . (1) 
whether the writing, recording or photograph ever existed in the first 
place; (2) whether some other writing, recording, or photograph that is 
offered into evidence is in fact the original; and (3) whether ‘other’ 
 
 286.  Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 580-82. 
 287.  Id. at 581 (citing Wapnick v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2002-45 (T.C. 
2002) (holding that summaries of voluminous computer records were admissible under Rule 1006 
even though they were prepared in anticipation of litigation, because the underlying documents had 
been admitted into evidence and reasonably had been made available to the opposing party to 
inspect). 
 288. See supra Part II (discussing the conditional relevance rule). 
 289. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 582. 
 290. Id. at 582-83 (citing FED. R. EVID. 1008 advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 Proposed 
Rules). 
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(i.e. secondary) evidence of contents correctly reflects the content of 
the writing, recording or photograph.291 
In practice, these conditions frequently occur, such as when parties 
negotiate a contract and exchange successive revisions of it by e-mail. 
The plaintiff may contend that there was a written contract, and produce 
what she claims it is, while the defendant may deny that there ever was a 
meeting of the minds.  Alternatively, they may agree that there was a 
contract, but offer different versions of it.  Further, where secondary 
evidence is admissible, there may be conflicting versions of the content 
of a relevant document.  When this occurs, then Rule 1008 requires the 
trial judge to submit to the jury the competing factual contentions, and it 
is up to the jury to decide which to accept, and which to reject.  What 
counsel sometimes overlook is that if the dispute of fact concerns a 
document that is essential to the resolution of a claim or defense, then 
summary judgment will not be possible to resolve the dispute, as there is 
a genuine dispute of material fact that must be submitted to the jury.  
The hypothetical starting this Article shows how easily this can occur 
when ESI/digital evidence is involved.  If witnesses from ConsumerPro 
and Tele-Sales disagree on which version of the ConsumerPro script 
appeared on the website when the Tele-Sales operators secured a 
particular consumer contract, then the jury will have to resolve which 
version is the operative one, and neither side will be able to avoid trial 
through summary judgment practice. 
In its discussion of the original writing rule, the Lorraine opinion 
focused on the structure of the rule and how it has been applied thus far 
by courts to ESI/digital evidence.  However, the court cases that have 
done so to date have not wrestled with some fundamental issues about 
just what constitutes the original of a computer generated or stored 
document.   As noted above, the definition of an “original” found in 
Rule 1001 encompasses electronic documents, and the definition is 
extremely broad:  “If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any 
printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data 
accurately, is an ‘original.’”292  This definition does not give much 
guidance about what to do with the components of an electronically 
generated document that are not visible when the document is “opened” 
on the computer and the screen-readable version is visible.  Those 
familiar with electronic documents know that all documents contain 
 
 291. Id. at 583. 
 292. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3). 
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“metadata,” which, as Lorraine notes, has been usefully defined as 
follows:  
Metadata, “commonly described as ‘data about data,’ is defined as 
‘information describing the history, tracking, or management of an 
electronic document.’ . . . [Metadata includes] ‘all of the contextual, 
processing, and use information needed to identify and certify the 
scope, authenticity, and integrity of active or archival electronic 
information or records.’”293 
To date, courts have not had to resolve the relationship that 
metadata has to the screen-readable version of a document in the context 
of the original writing rule.  Expressed differently, is the metadata part 
of the “original” of the document under Rule 1001(3), or only the 
portion that is “readable by sight” when the document first is opened? 
In a more robust fashion, George Paul describes this difference 
between a “digital” document and a “paper” document, the latter of 
which is three-dimensional.  He observes:  
Writings in the digital realm are different. . . . Such records are very 
close to “pure information,” and exist by virtue of a mere succession of 
the differentiation of 1s and 0s, distinguished by electricity flowing in 
machine systems.  In writing today we deal in pure information 
objects, unfettered by matter.  They can be whisked or shaken or 
rearranged in an instant.  Such records are actually layers of 
abstraction, one view stacked on top of another.  At the deepest layer is 
the world of bits, 1s and 0s.  As one builds on top of this, the bits of 
information can carry letters and numbers.  This collection of letters 
and numbers may be partitioned into smaller collections to represent, 
for example, such categories as “name” and “date of birth.”  Then there 
are layers designed to be presentations of information to viewers of 
that data.  Conjoined with this data is a collection of information about 
the other data, which collection is often called “metadata.”  This 
metadata is information that software developers have designed to be 
recorded in a record and that is inserted there by the system itself. For 
example, even without making any entry or modifying any data, each 
time one saves a document one is editing on a word-processing 
program that program, and the system that supports that program, will 
record the date and time of that “save” event in the data being “saved.”  
This information then becomes a part of the record . . . .   
 
 
 293. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547 (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 
640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005)). 
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There is also usually a top-layered presentation view that is normally 
viewed by the operator of the program in question.  For example, in a 
word-processing application, such as Microsoft Word, one can view a 
page as it is being typed.  This view contains what the layperson 
normally considers the data of a file.  Interestingly, although the view 
often looks very much like a page of paper, this is of course an illusion, 
something the application has designed to mimic old-style physical 
records.  What we are viewing is simply the top-level view: the view of 
what the record normally shows to people who view it on a screen and 
also upon printing out the record onto paper.294 
To date, the courts that have considered the original writing rule as 
it applies to the admissibility of ESI/digital evidence have tended to 
view the “original” as the “top-level view” of “what the record normally 
shows to people who view it on a screen and also upon printing out the 
record onto paper.”295  Disputes about metadata have tended to focus on 
its discoverability,296 or its utility in authenticating a digital document.297  
Whether they will continue to do so, or begin to expand their view of 
whether the original is to include the “hidden” or unseen digital 
components of a computer-generated or stored document remains to be 
seen.  However, it may be predicted that for the foreseeable future they 
will continue to treat the “original” as the portion that is viewed when 
the digital document is opened or printed from a computer because that 
is the portion that is “readable by sight” as stated in Rule 1001(3), and 
because that is the component of the digital document that tends to be 
the version that is used or disseminated by its author, and hence most 
likely to be the legally operative version that figures into a future legal 
dispute. 
 
 294. PAUL, supra note 5, at 19-20 (emphasis added). 
 295. Id. at 20.  See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Reyes, No. 03 C 8056, 2006 WL 533364, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2006) (holding that a computer printout of information that has been stored on the 
computer is an “original” under Rule 1001(3)); Con-Way Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Auto Sports 
Unlimited, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-570, 2007 WL 2875207, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007) (noting 
that reprinted invoices based on information extracted from computer which generated the invoices 
originally sent to defendant constitute “originals” under Rule 1001(3)). 
 296. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (allowing a party to identify the form or forms of production 
in which an electronic document is to be produced, which can include its “native” form, containing 
metadata); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 576-83; Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646-55 (discussing the 
discoverability of metadata). 
 297. Lorraine, 242 F.R.D. at 547 (discussing how metadata may be used to authenticate ESI). 
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VI.  PREJUDICIAL IMPACT 
The final “evidentiary hurdle” to admissibility of ESI or digital 
evidence discussed in Lorraine is whether the evidence, if otherwise 
admissible under all of the previously discussed evidentiary rules, is 
excessively prejudicial when compared with its probative value.  At the 
outset, it should be emphasized that the balancing that Rule 403 
contemplates favors admissibility over exclusion.  Under the rule, 
relevant and otherwise admissible evidence, including ESI, is only 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.298  Thus, the prejudice must be disproportionately 
greater than its probative value.  And because all evidence offered by 
one party is prejudicial to the extent that it proves the proffering party’s 
case against the party to which the evidence is offered, the prejudice 
needed to justify exclusion under Rule 403 must be “unfair.” 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, reflecting back on the Lorraine opinion two years 
after it was issued, Lorraine continues to be the only case to attempt a 
comprehensive analysis of evidentiary issues associated with admitting 
ESI.  The opinion seems to have succeeded in its stated objective—to 
provide a useful and exhaustive guide to courts and lawyers regarding 
the rules and principles that must be applied to ensure admissibility of 
ESI or digital evidence, which increasingly accounts for all non-
testimonial evidence offered as evidence at trial or in summary 
judgment.  Further, following Lorraine, courts, both those which cite 
Lorraine and those which do not, have mainly adhered to the standards 
and principles that Lorraine advanced.  As such, it continues to remain a 
useful resource, especially as a starting point in approaching this 
challenging area of evidence law.  This Article has brought Lorraine 
forward, by discussing subsequent developments in digital evidence law, 
making observations about trends that can be expected to continue, and 
forecasting issues that await future development.  Therefore, it was a 
worthwhile exercise to take a moment, and go back to the future. 
 
 298. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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